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PREFACE
Financial crises in emerging market economies
are often accompanied by difficulties of the
sovereign concerned to honour its contractual
obligations to foreign creditors. The
expectation of such payment difficulties can
trigger disorderly actions if creditors rush to
withdraw their investment from the crisis
country of if the debtor is tempted to resort to
unorthodox measures to prevent capital
outflows. This can magnify the costs of the
crisis and delay a timely restoration of normal
market functioning. The official sector (mostly
the IMF) may reduce the likelihood of such a
disorderly outcome by extending financial
assistance. But there are limits to its
involvement, not least because the potential
volume of IMF lending is small compared to
the size of private capital flows to emerging
market economies and because a large “bail
out” by the official sector would lead to moral
hazard. Countries would possibly not take
necessary preventive action to avoid financial
crises in the first place.
For both these reasons – limited official funds
and moral hazard – private sector creditors to a
crisis country need to share some of the
financial burden and thereby actively get
involved in the management of financial crises
in emerging market economies. In practice this
inevitably implies that private creditors incur
some financial costs in the event of a crisis. The
purpose of this report is to review the set of
instruments that may promote such an
involvement of private sector creditors. The
key instruments in this regard are that private
sector creditors forego some of their claims,
lengthen maturities, renounce interest receipts
for some periods or otherwise accept losses to
alleviate the burden of the crisis country.
Clearly, given the size of financial markets, it
is nowadays accepted that a contribution of
private sector creditors is generally needed to
successfully manage financial crises.
The promotion of orderly crisis management
has been central on the international
community’s agenda for several years. A
number of steps have been taken to improve the
framework for the involvement of the private
sector, but the implementation of this
framework still raises critical challenges, not
least in terms of timely diagnosis of the actions
needed by all stakeholders. To assess these
challenges, this report provides a stock-taking
of past experience and identifies areas of
possible improvement to the framework for
crisis resolution.
This report was prepared by a task force of the
International Relations Committee (IRC), a
Committee established by the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) to deal with
international monetary and financial affairs.
The task force was composed of staff members
of several central banks of the ESCB. The
report has been discussed by the International
Relations Committee and the authors gratefully
acknowledge substantive comments made by
the Committee members on that occasion. In
particular, they would like to thank Hervé
Hannoun, Deputy Governor of the Banque de
France and Chairman of the IRC, for his
encouragement of the task force work and for
his valuable guidance. In addition, the report
has been discussed by the Sub-Committee on
IMF and Related Issues of the Economic and
Financial Committee1, chaired by Lorenzo Bini
Smaghi, and helpful comments from this
Committee are acknowledged as well.2
1 The Economic and Financial Committee is a consultative
committee that contributes to the preparation of the work of
the ECOFIN Council.
2 The authors would also like to thank Christian Dyckner for
valuable assistance in the finalisation of the paper.5
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 10 years, a number of emerging
market economies have suffered pronounced
financial crises with far-reaching negative
economic implications. These crises implied
substantial losses in terms of wealth, output
and jobs and were often accompanied by
currency and banking crises. For example, the
average cumulative output losses for Argentina
(2001-02 crisis), Indonesia (1998) and Turkey
(1999-2001) have been estimated in the range
of 12-15% of GDP.
The actions of the country’s private sector
creditors are a crucial variable in the
management of such crises. When there are
signs that a crisis starts unfolding, external
creditors may have an interest in withdrawing
their funds as quickly as possible so as to
minimise potential losses. However, if all
creditors adopt such a “rush-to-the-exit”
strategy, the economic and financial
consequences may be magnified and the
resulting loss in welfare may be detrimental to
the country and its creditors alike. By contrast,
if creditors are willing to maintain some
exposure in the country, the crisis may be less
disruptive, facilitating a quick return to normal
market conditions, which is ultimately also in
the interest of creditors.
Such considerations about the role of the
private sector in crisis situations were largely
absent in the international policy debate until
the 1970s but have gained prominence since
then due to the increasing amount of private
capital flowing to developing and emerging
market countries. In the debt crises of the
1980s, the focal point of the policy debate
concerned the actions of commercial banks, as
private lending to developing countries mainly
took the form of bank loans at that time. In the
second half of the 1990s, the policy debate took
a new dimension as sovereigns tapped
international financial markets increasingly
through sovereign bond issues instead of bank
loans. Hence, instead of bringing commercial
banks around the table – for example through
the London Club – it was now important to
bring bondholders around the table, which was
seen as particularly challenging given that
bondholders are usually far higher in numbers
(often several tens of thousands, compared to a
few dozen international creditor banks in
earlier crises) and also geographically more
dispersed.
The term private sector involvement was
coined in the late-1990s in the context of the
discussions on bond restructurings and capital
account crises. It refers, broadly speaking, to
the contributions or efforts of private sector
creditors to the crisis resolution process;
specifically, it means that the private sector
shares some of the costs of a financial crisis by
incurring itself financial losses, such loss-
bearing can be the result of a loss in principal
(write-off of debt), a lengthening of the
repayment schedule or the reduction in interest
payments. In order to ensure an effective
involvement of private sector creditors, the
international community started to developed a
broad roadmap for crisis resolution. At the
Annual Meeting in September 2000, held in
Prague, the IMF defined a broad framework for
crisis resolution which acknowledges the need
for voluntary approaches to overcome creditor
coordination problems and, in more extreme
cases, for “a broader spectrum of actions by
private sector creditors, including
comprehensive debt restructuring”,
recognising that “a temporary payments
suspension or standstill may be unavoidable.”
Another important step was taken in late-2002,
when the IMF strengthened the constraints on
the volume of its own lending to crisis
countries, thus strengthening the need for
private sector contributions.
Efficient crisis resolution requires, however,
not only a broad policy framework that
provides an appropriate set of incentives. It
also requires a set of operational instruments
through which the involvement of the private
sector can be organised and fostered. Through a
number of recent crises, experience has been
gained with some instruments, such as7
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INTRODUCTION
exchanges of bond contracts and extensions of
interbank credit lines. In more recent years
work has concentrated on the more widespread
introduction of clauses in bond contracts that
allow for more orderly restructuring in the
event of sovereign debt crises (collective
action clauses). In addition, emerging market
issuers and leading private creditor
organisations agreed in November 2004 on a
set of “Principles for Stable capital Flows and
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”,
which promote, among other things, orderly
debt restructuring negotiations and fair
treatment of all affected creditors.
This report aims to deepen the understanding of
past experience with the involvement of private
sector creditors. First of all, the report recalls
why such involvement is relevant in the overall
framework for crisis management (Section 1).
The report then takes a closer look at the
specific instruments that have been used in past
crises to promote private sector involvement
(Section 2). Policy conclusions are presented at
the end of the report (Section 3). The annexes
provide a more thorough analysis of some of
the issues at stake.8
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1 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR
CREDITORS
1.1 MOTIVATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND THE ROLE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The greater role of capital markets and the
rapid growth of emerging market economies
that have characterised the globalisation of the
world economy have been accompanied by
substantial private capital flows to emerging
market economies. Barely reaching USD 10
billion in the early 1980’s, private capital flows
to main emerging markets have increased more
than tenfold since then. The share of private
flows in total capital flows increased from less
than 40% in the 1980s to over 90% in the ten
years ending in 2004. These developments are
welcome, as they contribute to sustained
growth in emerging markets and promote an
efficient allocation of resources worldwide.
However, they also leave the debtor countries
vulnerable to the risk of rapid capital flows
reversals triggered by a change of investor
sentiment towards their economic policies or
economic situation. One distinctive feature of
such reversals of capital flows is that they have
proved to be pro-cyclical because of self-
fulfilling expectations by private investors:
once problems are perceived by some creditors,
leading to the withdrawal of their funds, this
aggravates the situation in the country and
reinforces the negative expectations of other
creditors. The resulting massive reversal of
capital flows can contribute to sovereign
default, or exacerbate the consequences of a
crisis.
Such capital flow reversals create external
financing needs of the crisis country, which in
some situations are too large to be addressed
only through adjustment policies that aim at
reducing domestic absorption relative to
production. Financial programmes by the
official sector, in particular IMF and World
Bank financing, in some cases supplemented
by bilateral support packages, may alleviate
the external financing needs, but the amounts
of official financing will typically be
insufficient to cover the financing needs. In
several recent crises, private sector creditors
have therefore been asked to contribute to
filling the external financing needs of crisis
countries. The efforts by the private sector to
fill the financing gap may take various forms.
The private sector might modify the terms of
existing credit as mentioned above, for
example through a lengthening of the original
maturities or a softening of payment terms, or it
might commit to providing new credit.
Private sector involvement is, however, always
challenging to achieve due to fundamental
uncertainty regarding the debtor’s ability to
pay in a crisis situation, almost unavoidable
differences in the assessment of the situation
by individual creditors and creditor
coordination problems. Creditor coordination
problems arise when a creditor attempts to
withdraw its investment, thus imposing a
negative externality on other creditors as it
reduces the total amount of the country’s
available resources to service external debt.
This implies that, what is rational from the
point of view of an individual creditor may not
be rational from a global perspective given that
all creditors may act in a similar fashion. The
uncertainty concerns in the first place the value
of creditors’ claims in a country during a
financial crisis. This uncertainty derives not
only from other creditors’ behaviour but also
from the difficulty in assessing whether
payment problems arise out of genuine
inability or simple unwillingness on the part of
the sovereign to repay its debt, in a context
where sovereign debtor’s assets are usually
difficult to seize. Finally, the relative
importance of the financial claims on the crisis
country is likely to differ markedly among the
various creditors, which is bound to imply
differences in the approach towards their
involvement in crisis resolution.
Due to all these challenges, private sector
involvement usually does not arise
spontaneously, even in situations where it is
rational from a global welfare perspective.9
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Therefore, debtor countries, or even the
international community at large, have in some
past crises actively encouraged private sector
creditors to step in. Such encouragement
implies, of course, a delicate balancing act.
Clearly, the official sector should support the
sanctity of contracts and the protection of
creditor rights. At the same time, the official
sector may aim to ensure that all stakeholders
bear the consequences of their actions (e.g.
creditors accepting losses associated with risk
taking), which is taken up in the subsequent
section.
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR
CREDITORS AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT
From a general policy perspective, crisis
management should be aimed at finding an
appropriate balance between domestic
adjustment, private financing and official
financing. Excessive reliance in one of the
three components is generally undesirable or
even unfeasible. Three main considerations
highlight the importance of involving the
private sector in crisis management.
– First, private financial flows have become a
predominant source of financing for
emerging market economies. The amount of
private net capital flows to main emerging
market economies was close to zero in the
mid-1980s, following the Latin American
debt crisis, and picked up to more than USD
160 billion in 2004, despite a dip towards the
end of the 1990s and early 2000s as a result
of the succession of financial crises in
several recipient countries. Given the
growing weight of private sector creditors in
emerging market financing, their
involvement in crisis resolution is
increasingly necessary, as otherwise
unrealistically large domestic adjustment
efforts and official financing would be
required. The increasing importance of
private financing implies that official
financing, which is bound by resource
constraints of international financial
institutions, is typically insufficient to
address the external financial problems of
crisis countries.
– Second, empirical evidence suggests that
exclusive reliance on the catalytic approach
may not yield satisfactory results. As
illustrated in Annex 1, exclusive reliance on
official financing coupled with IMF
adjustment programmes does not always
generate a spontaneous resumption of
private capital flows. Evidence in support of
the catalytic approach appears to be sparse
and limited to specific circumstances.3
Nevertheless, the lack of empirical support
for the catalytic approach should be
interpreted with caution, as most authors
point to several methodological
shortcomings in measuring catalytic
effects.4
– Third, excessive reliance on official
financing may have undesirable effects on
the incentives for debtor countries and
private sector creditors. The availability of
large official support packages, or the
perception thereof, may influence the
behaviour of the borrowers and lenders in
much the same way as an insurance policy
influences the behaviour of the insured: it
reduces incentives to take preventive action.
Such moral hazard can be limited by
ensuring that the burden of financial crises is
shared by all parties involved, including the
private sector. The existence of moral
3 In a number of studies, some evidence of catalytic effect was
found: (i) for countries with intermediate credit ratings and
when programmes are associated with limited structural
conditions, (ii) in countries facing a marked volatility in their
external sector and for precautionary, large and ongoing
programmes and (iii) for precautionary arrangements and the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), particularly
concerning foreign direct investment and depending on the
appropriateness of the programme in terms of size,
transparency and conditionality involved. Other studies found
no catalytic effect, and some papers even concluded that IMF
programmes may promote capital outflows.
4 The various methodological approaches developed to test the
catalytic effect of IMF programmes (statistical analyses of
capital flows and spreads, and case studies) have faced similar
shortcomings among which the following stand out in
particular: (i) poor quality of existing data, (ii) problems in
defining a valid counterfactual, (iii) sample selection bias,
(iv) weak or non-existent dynamic specification.10
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 32
July 2005
hazard on the creditor side has been tested in
empirical literature, but the evidence
remains somewhat inconclusive5 (see Table
1 for a short survey of relevant literature).
Several studies find that creditor moral
hazard decreased significantly as a result of
the Russian default in August 1998,
suggesting that moral hazard had been at
play beforehand. However, the research on
moral hazard has some limitations, as
investor’s perceptions can be influenced by
other factors and the conditions under which
the effect of official support could be
isolated are not easily available. In addition,
the literature is confronted with similar
methodological difficulties as in the case of
the catalytic approach and should therefore
be interpreted with caution.6 Nevertheless,
despite these methodological difficulties,
the potential negative impact of consistently
large official financing packages on
incentive structures for private investors
should not be underestimated.
1.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR ORDERLY
CRISIS RESOLUTION
The promotion of an orderly resolution process
in crisis situations has been an important topic
on the international community’s agenda for
several years. To achieve more orderly crisis
resolution, the international community has
developed a set of general policy principles
that also refer to the involvement of private
sector creditors among which two are standing
out:
– Prague framework for crisis resolution: An
important step was taken at the Annual
Meetings of the IMF and World Bank in
Prague (September 2000), where the
International Monetary and Financial
Committee identified an approach based on
a distinction between three crisis situations:
(i) cases where catalytic effects are
achieved, (ii)  cases where voluntary but
encouraged approaches are needed to secure
private financing and (iii) cases where debt
restructuring or payment suspension is
warranted (IMF, 2000a).7 The framework is
thus based on a general understanding that,
depending on the case at hand, crises can be
resolved either through purely catalytic
financing (first case) or through explicit
actions aimed at fostering private sector
involvement in a narrow sense (second and
third cases).
– Exceptional access framework: Another
important step was taken in 2002/03, when
the IMF established specific criteria and
procedures for access to IMF financing
above normal access limits. By setting clear
limits for the availability of official
financing, this exceptional access
framework is aimed at reducing moral
hazard problems and underscores the
importance of private sector contributions to
crisis resolution.
However, developments since 2000 have
illustrated that the implementation of these
frameworks raises critical challenges, not least
in terms of timely diagnosis and discipline
among all stakeholders. First, compliance with
the new exceptional access framework has yet
to be demonstrated. In the three cases of
exceptional access since the establishment of
the framework (Argentina in September 2003,
Brazil in November 2003 and Turkey in May
5 Creditor moral hazard is usually tested in the literature by
using asset prices as a source of information about investor’s
perceptions. There is hardly any empirical literature about
debtor moral hazard.
6 The similarities in terms of methodological difficulties are
not surprising. After all, both types of literature assess the
impact of IMF programmes on the behaviour of private
investors. The key difference is that the catalytic approach
refers to ex-post positive  effects on capital flows, whereas
moral hazard refers to ex-ante negative effects on debtor and
private creditor discipline. Moreover, the empirical analysis
of the catalytic effect focuses on the effect of a large number
of IMF lending decisions on capital flows towards individual
countries, whereas the analysis of moral hazard focuses on the
effect of landmark lending decisions by the IMF on investor
behaviour toward emerging markets in general.
7 The need for PSI was also recognised by the private sector:
The Institute of International Finance (2001) published a
“Broad framework of principles for private sector
involvement in crisis prevention and resolution”, which
derived from the basic principle “that private investors and
creditors expect to bear the consequences of their decisions
and do not seek to be ‘bailed out’ by the official sector”.11
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2005), it is debatable whether all criteria for
exceptional access were fulfilled. Future
adherence to the new framework will be critical
to set the right incentives in line with the
objectives of the framework. Second, recent
experience has highlighted the importance of
the qualitative dimensions of private sector
involvement. An efficient crisis resolution
process should lead to a situation that is
sustainable and not hindered by a stalemate in
the negotiations between sovereign debtors and
their private sector creditors. Generally
speaking, this quality has several facets:
effectiveness in bringing a country’s external
position back to a sustainable path; timeliness
and orderliness with which a viable solution is
reached; degree to which the legal and
contractual rights and obligations of all parties
are respected (whereby unilaterally imposed
solutions should be considered only under
well-specified conditions and as measure of
last resort); and a sustainable combination of
contributions by the debtor country, private
creditors and official creditors as well as
among private creditors themselves.
Over recent years, progress has been made in
the development of new instruments that
should promote an orderly resolution of
sovereign debt crises in future, where two
elements are particularly important:
– First, the more widespread introduction of
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in
sovereign bond contracts. Such clauses are
aimed at fostering early dialogue between
the debtor and the bondholders, avoiding
situations where a minority of bondholders
block an agreement on a change in the terms
of the contract, and ensuring that disruptive
legal action by individual creditors does not
hamper the debt workout. Such provisions
were already included in bond contracts
issued under some jurisdictions (e.g.
English law), but were not the market norm
in other jurisdictions (e.g. New York law).
From early-2003 on, however, market
practices have been adapted in the latter
jurisdictions, and all sovereign bond
contracts are now issued with CACs.8 In
future, the use of these clauses might
therefore become highly relevant when
sovereign debtors face acute payment
problems. In this report, however, the use of
CACs in debt restructuring is only discussed
in the context of bond exchanges, because it
is only there that some practical experience
has been gained.
– Second, the recent agreement between some
emerging market issuers and some private
sector representatives on a set of
“Principles for Stable Capital flows and
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging
Markets” (IIF et al, 2004). These principles
were developed by a group of key emerging
market countries – including Brazil, Korea,
Mexico – and by international banks and
other investors, coordinated by the Institute
of International Finance. The Principles
were endorsed at the G20 meeting of finance
ministers and central bank governors in
Berlin in November 2004. They set out
guidelines for the behaviour of debtors and
creditors in normal times but also in cases of
stress. Going forward, the Principles may
prove to be a factor in helping to shape a
more orderly process for resolving
sovereign crises.
The international community also discussed a
possible statutory approach to debt
restructuring, i.e. an approach embedded in
international law, notably under the form of a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM). Even though the proposal was
considered unfeasible at that stage in April
2003, the discussions helped to improve
understanding of the issues at stake and in
nurturing a consensus on the use of CACs and
on the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.
8 However, most bonds issued under New York law use mainly
majority amendment clauses, and do not include clauses that
either provide for collective representation to avoid disruptive
legal action by creditors or foster early dialogue, coordination
and communication between creditors and a sovereign debtor,
as recommended by the G10 in their September 2002 report on
contractual clauses.12
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2 OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO
PROMOTE THE INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE
SECTOR CREDITORS
2.1 TYPES OF CAPITAL FLOW AND PRIVATE
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
The precise nature of private sector involvement
in crisis situations depends on the types of
financial flow concerned (see Box 1 for a brief
review of stylised facts concerning capital flows
to main emerging markets). Two main forms of
debt are relevant for emerging market
economies, notably bank loans and bonded debt,
which raise different questions in terms of debt
restructuring. In countries with a significant
amount of bank loan debt, the involvement of
private creditors typically assumes the form of a
London Club arrangement9 (for debt owed by the
sovereign) or rollover agreements (for debt
owed by the private sector). In a rollover foreign
commercial banks agree to temporarily maintain
a certain amount of short-term debt to domestic
financial or non-financial institutions.
Decisions concerning a rollover are usually
taken in a concerted way by major banks, which
monitor developments related to the rollover
and to the financial situation of the debtor
country. The recent resumption of financial
inflows to emerging market economies in the
form of bank loans implies that the role of
commercial bank creditors should not be
overlooked. At the same time, bank loans are
increasingly extended to the non-financial
private sector in EMEs, so that crisis resolution
instruments that are targeted at bank loans to
sovereigns may gradually lose importance.
With the move towards emerging market
financing through bond issuance in the late
1980s to the mid-1990s, issues related to bond
restructuring have gained in importance. In
contrast to bank loans, bonded debt typically
involves a greater number of creditors. As
bondholders are usually more atomised and
dispersed than commercial banks, bonded debt
may raise greater challenges in terms of
creditor coordination in the case of a
restructuring. . Bond exchanges have become a
common technique to involve the private sector
in such circumstances. They amount to
exchanging the existing bonds for new ones
with different conditions.
Box 1
STYLISED FACTS ON THE COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL FLOWS TO MAIN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES
Since the early 1990s private capital flows have been the dominant form of capital flows to
emerging market economies (EMEs) and have recently started to resume. Net foreign direct
investment (FDI) has proven to be the least volatile and the largest single component of net
inflows to EMEs since 1990. Bond flows were the swiftest to respond to capital account
liberalisation in EMEs in the early 1990s and have constituted an important part of emerging
markets finance throughout the 1990s. However, large net outflows have been recorded since
2000. A recent development in sovereign bonds has been the relatively widespread
introduction of CACs, including in bonds issued under New York law (about 40% of
outstanding sovereign bonds currently include CACs). Other private flows, which mainly
comprise bank loans, were affected by sovereign defaults in Latin America in the early 1980s
and remained largely negative until the turn of the century. This long period of net outflows
partly reflects a large fall in net bank lending to Asia, but is also linked to substitution of cross-
9  The London Club is an informal forum which has dealt with
restructurings of bank loans to sovereign debtors since 1976.13
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border loans for domestic loans by foreign
bank subsidiaries.  More recently, these flows
have turned positive in response to increased
borrowing in Asia and in emerging European
economies.
The trends in terms of financial inflows are
reflected in the composition of outstanding
external debt (Chart B). At the end of 2003,
bank loans constituted a significant share of
total external debt (especially in Asia), albeit
significantly lower than that in 1996. Debt
securities are the second most important
group, accounting for more than ¼ of total
debt (in Latin America more than 40%). Debt
to the official sector accounts for less than ¼
of total external debt of major EMEs. The
most significant trend since 1996 is the
replacement of bank loans by debt securities
in the composition of external debt. The share
of multilateral claims in external debt has
almost doubled in the period under
consideration, reflecting mainly the large
IMF programmes in a number of countries
(Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey).
Chart A Net capital flows to selected
emerging market economies, breakdown by
instrument
(USD billion)
Notes: Net capital flows are defined as the sum of net direct
investment, net portfolio investment, and other investment
flows. They are equal to the balance on the financial account
minus the change in reserve assets in the standard balance of
payment presentation (IMF’s Fifth Balance of Payments
Manual). This implies that Fund financing, as part of the
reserve assets, is not included in the capital flows. The
following emerging market economies are included:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China (Mainland), China (Hong
Kong), China (Taiwan), Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Russia, Singapore, South-Korea, Thailand, Turkey
and Venezuela.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International



















private flows, debt securities
private flows, equity securities





Chart B Outstanding External Debt of Major Emerging Markets, breakdown by instrument
(In percent)
Note: Emerging market countries are listed in the note to Chart A.
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2.2 MAIN INSTRUMENTS TO FOSTER THE
INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR
CREDITORS
Apart from the instruments developed recently
by the international community (the wider
usage of Collective Action Clauses and the
adoption of the Principles for Stable Capital
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring), various
instruments have been used in past crises to
facilitate the involvement of private creditors.
These include in particular bond exchanges and
interbank rollovers that as the key instruments
have contributed to the resolution of a number
of crises over the past ten years. Other
instruments have also been relevant, for
example temporary suspensions of debt service
(through standstills or the imposition of capital
controls) or the provision of financing on a
contingent basis (private contingent credit
lines). The remainder of this section reviews
the experience with these instruments, notably
bond exchanges, interbank rollovers,
standstills, capital controls and private
contingent credit lines.10
BOND EXCHANGES (SEE ALSO ANNEX 2 FOR A
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS)
In a bond exchange, participating bondholders
agree to substitute their existing bonds for new
bonds with different terms. Bond exchanges
are initiated through an exchange offer by the
sovereign debtor, which individual
bondholders may accept or decline. Depending
on the terms of the new bonds, the relief
provided by bond exchanges can range from
temporary cash-flow relief to a reduction in the
face value of the outstanding amounts.
Sovereign bond exchanges are a rather recent
phenomenon in the post-Second World War
era. Since 1999, at least seven sovereigns have
carried out bond exchanges11, thereby ending
the existing perception that bonds enjoyed de
facto seniority.12 Each of these cases differed in
terms of the ownership of the bonds being
restructured,13 the timing of the exchange offer
(pre-default, e.g. Pakistan, Uruguay, Ukraine14
and Moldova versus post-default, e.g.
Argentina, Ecuador, and Russia), and the
nature of the dialogue with creditors (from
wide-ranging contacts with creditors at an
early stage by Uruguay to limited contacts in
the case of Ecuador). Pre-default exchanges
tended to be completed more quickly than post-
default exchanges and seem to have resulted in
smaller haircuts. Creditor participation has
been high in all cases (with participation rates
ranging between 93% in the case of Uruguay to
99% in Pakistan and Ukraine), with the notable
exception of Argentina (76%). In Ukraine,
Ecuador and Uruguay, holdout creditors were
eventually paid in full by the debtor.
Bond exchanges, by themselves, do not directly
address collective action problems, as they
require the consent of individual bondholders.
Nevertheless, in some cases, legal techniques
have been used to bind in minority creditors. In
a number of exchanges of bonds that included
Collective Action Clauses (Ukraine, Moldova
and Uruguay), majority restructuring
provisions were used to bind all creditors. In
10 The experience of the London Club is not analysed in detail in
this report, since (i) bank loans to sovereign debtors have
declined in importance compared with bond financing and the
majority of more recent bank loans went to private debtors and
(ii) in most recent crises in the 1990s, with the notable
exceptions of Russia, Indonesia and Serbia, the mechanism of
the London Club creditors has not been invoked to resolve
sovereign crisis. Nevertheless, should there be cases in future
where medium-term loans from commercial banks represent a
significant portion of a sovereign’s outstanding debt, the
London Club is likely to be the mechanism that is invoked to
help organise a restructuring.
11 In addition, in 2004 Dominica attempted to exchange
commercial debt for new bonds. By September 2004 holders
of 72% of eligible claims had participated. Also the
Dominican Republic is due to launch a bond exchange in the
second quarter of 2005 (see IMF (2005)).
12 In the 1980s the incidence of payment difficulties on bonds
was small relative to that of other types of debt, suggesting
that some debtors might have been affording bonds
preferential treatment. In that period, four countries
restructured bonds: Costa Rica and Guatemala without
incurring defaults, and Panama and Nigeria after defaults.
None of these cases involved any debt reduction.
13 Predominance of retail investors, e.g. in Ukraine, versus
holdings by large institutional investors (Ecuador); large
exposure of domestic creditors (Argentina) versus non-
residents (Ecuador, Moldova).
14 Ukraine launched its debt exchange while it was still up-to-
date on its payments. However, when grace periods for two
later payment defaults expired, Ukraine was in default until
the completion of the exchange.15
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Ecuador, where none of the bonds included
such clauses, exit consents15 were used to make
the old bonds less attractive and thus to reduce
the incentives for holding out. In Uruguay an
innovative use was made of both Collective
Action Clauses (on Samurai bonds) and exit
consents (on New York law bonds). By
contrast, in Pakistan, the bonds contained such
clauses but the sovereign chose not to use them
because of concerns that calling a bondholder
meeting might actually facilitate the
organisation of bondholders opposed to a
restructuring.
The experience with bond exchanges so far has
shown that creditors and debtors have been able
to renegotiate sovereign bond contracts with
high participation rates and limited litigation
despite the absence of a negotiating
framework. At the same time, when
considering the applicability of these
experiences to future cases some caveats have
to be borne in mind. The first caveat relates to
the complexity of the bond exchange as the
cases so far concerned countries with a
relatively small number of outstanding bonds.
The higher the number of bond issues to be
restructured and the greater the weight of bonds
in the overall indebtedness of a country, the
more difficult a debt exchange might be.16 The
second caveat relates to the possible lack of
transparency in bond exchanges. The diversity
of approaches used in the past – while
providing flexibility for the debtor – has
entailed a high degree of uncertainty for
creditors about the procedures and the final
outcome,17 which might contribute to the
difficulty of achieving timely agreements in
the future. While the threat of litigation did not
disrupt past reschedulings, several court cases
are now pending against Argentina. The third
caveat concerns the fact that post-default cases
have tended to yield higher haircuts than pre-
default cases. A positive reading of this
difference is that with the launching of a debt
restructuring at an early stage, a country avoids
costs associated with default and hence needs a
smaller haircut. But a negative reading could
be that a pre-default exchange might fail to lead
to a sustainable situation, although evidence so
far is inconclusive. It might also be that in a
post-default situation a debtor is in a stronger
position to table a “take it or leave it” offer.
The increasing inclusion of Collective Action
Clauses in recent sovereign bond issues could
have implications for future bond exchanges. It
is expected that sovereign debtors will rely
more often on these provisions when aiming to
restructure bonds, either alone or together with
bond exchanges. In combining such clauses
with bond exchanges, the restructuring process
can in principle benefit from the positive
features of both instruments. Collective Action
Clauses have the advantage of allowing
amendments to the terms of existing bonds with
majority voting provisions which are also
binding on minority creditors. Bond exchanges
have the advantage of allowing the replacement
of several bond series with a single new
instrument (whereas with Collective Action
Clauses a debtor needs to change the terms of
each individual bond series, unless there are
aggregation clauses as used by Uruguay).
ROLLOVERS (SEE ALSO ANNEX 3)
Rollover agreements are informal
arrangements in which foreign commercial
banks commit to temporarily maintaining a
given level of short-term exposure to a crisis-
hit economy. Even though the claims
concerned virtually never concern sovereign
foreign debt and are towards financial or non-
financial institutions, they can become
important for the sovereign debtor because of
explicit or implicit sovereign guarantees that
15 Under exit consents, bondholders participating in the
exchange automatically vote in favour of the amendments to
certain non-financial terms of the bonds that they are about to
leave. For bonds issued under New York law, amendments to
non-financial terms typically require a simple majority only
(as well as the issuer’s consent).
16 While Ecuador exchanged six different bonds, Ukraine five
and Uruguay 19 series of bonds, in the case of Argentina
restructurings involved about 90 different bonds.
17 This also includes the opportunity for the debtor to avoid a
meaningful dialogue with its creditors. If a country is
unwilling to enter into such a dialogue, it can simply present a
“take-it-or-leave-it” option. Creditors are left with the choice
of either accepting the offer as it stands or facing the
substantial uncertainties and costs of resorting to litigation.16
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can exist to avoid a systemic banking system
collapse or because a withdrawal of such
international financing would trigger a
currency and banking crisis.
Rollovers of external bank claims were agreed
during the crises in South Korea, Thailand and
Indonesia (1997-98), Brazil (1999) and Turkey
(2000-2001). In each case the country’s
authorities invited major creditor banks to
meetings in which they explained the country’s
economic situation and requested a rollover.
The debtor countries’ central banks introduced
monitoring systems, the coverage of which was
largely limited to interbank transactions of
domestic banks (including their offshore
branches and subsidiaries) vis-à-vis foreign
banks. The debt to be rolled over was backed by
a guarantee from the government of the country
in question, which in turn was de facto backed
by large loans from the IMF. The IMF played a
key role in helping the debtor country monitor
the rollover and disseminate information (daily
or weekly flow of data, rollover ratios and net
changes in exposure), often conducted via IMF
Executive Directors to the central banks of the
creditor countries.
Regular teleconferences among the central
banks of large creditor countries (mostly G10;
Spain and Portugal participated in the case of
Brazil) were organised in order to monitor
developments and exchange information on
contacts with creditor banks. Debtor countries’
representatives participated in the conference
calls in the Brazilian and Turkish cases, but not
in the cases of South Korea and Indonesia. In
the case of South Korea, an agreement was
reached within the G10 that central banks
would actively persuade their creditor banks to
stick to the rollover agreement (“moral
suasion”). In the other cases, the decision to
exert such moral suasion was left to the
discretion of each individual central bank.
While some central banks contacted
commercial banks in their countries as a mild
form of moral suasion, others refused to exert
any form of pressure.
Experience with rollover agreements has been
mixed. The rollover in South Korea turned out
to be successful in providing a temporary
breathing space before a more comprehensive
restructuring was put in place. The Brazilian
rollover was also judged successful; Brazil’s
close contacts with creditor banks, its
continuous disclosure of information and a
solid adjustment programme were considered
helpful in that respect. By contrast, in the
Turkish case, the rollover was unsatisfactory,
with creditor banks reducing their exposure by
more than 40% during the monitoring period.
The non-satisfactory result in the case of
Turkey can be attributed to (i) the fact that
interbank exposures did not constitute the core
of Turkey’s macroeconomic problems, (ii)
concerns regarding the authorities’ political
commitment to adjustment measures, and (iii)
weak implementation procedures (no moral
suasion, inadequate coverage and ineffective
monitoring).
A key lesson from past experience relates to the
need for timely action so as to avoid large
outflows before a rollover is attempted.
Another important lesson is that a rollover is
likely to be most successful when there is a
strong commitment on the part of the
authorities to an IMF adjustment programme,
when creditors are convinced that the financial
problems are of short-term nature only, and
when there is a clear agreement on the range of
instruments covered. Securing the
participation of all major creditors also
contributes to a higher level of acceptance by
individual creditors.
– The review of experience also indicate that
disclosure of information to creditors about
rollover participation rates and changes in
exposure can help reduce collective action
problems among creditors. Likewise, the
publication of the names of creditor banks
participating in the rollover exercise might
have a positive impact. Finally, moral
suasion by the official community can help
to increase the chances of a successful
rollover. In some cases, particularly when17
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the problems of the banking sector in the
debtor country could have systemic
implications for the international financial
system, moral suasion may be warranted.
However, central banks in creditor countries
might be faced with a conflict of interest
given their mandates to ensure domestic
financial stability.
STANDSTILLS (SEE ALSO ANNEX 4)
The term standstill refers to all cases of
temporary suspensions of sovereign debt
service payments, either with or without the
agreement of creditors (a moratorium). In rare
cases, in particular when the country’s
payment problems are of temporary nature
(liquidity problems), such a temporary
suspension of payments might be sufficient to
put in place remedial policy measures and to
resume payments after a short while. In cases
where debt is unsustainable, a standstill may
offer a temporary solution pending a
restructuring of the liabilities concerned.
Standstills are thus typically not a stand-alone
instrument and have to be seen as a bridge to
achieving a more permanent solution through
the use of other instruments for sovereign debt
restructuring (e.g. bond exchanges or London
Club reschedulings). Moreover, a standstill
may or may not be accompanied by the
imposition of foreign exchange or capital
controls to reduce capital flight.
Except for claims of commercial banks
(London Club), experience with standstills on
sovereign debt to private sector creditors is
limited.18 The London Club has established an
informal standstill procedure under which
banks refrain from commencing legal action
against the sovereign once countries have
approached the London Club. Regarding
sovereign bonds, no similar forum or procedure
has been established in the post-Second World
War era,19 contributing to the long-standing
perception that bonds were immune from
rescheduling. Apart from a few bond
restructurings during the debt crisis of the
1980s, it was mainly in the late 1990s that
experience was gained with restructuring of
bonds through bond exchanges. Ecuador’s and
Russia’s exchanges were preceded by defaults.
Argentina maintained a unilateral standstill on
a significant share of its sovereign bonds since
December 2001, pending the restructuring that
was completed in early-2005.20
What lessons can be drawn from the existing
evidence? Standstills can play a useful role in
promoting the involvement of private sector
creditors. Both the London and Paris Clubs use
standstills as a normal part of their procedures,
and in some recent bond exchanges – Russia,
Ecuador and Argentina – standstills have been
invoked. While exchanges that have been
preceded by standstills have taken
considerably longer to complete than those
launched pre-default, higher levels of debt
reduction have been achieved, reducing the
debt to more sustainable levels. The limited
number of cases, however, makes it difficult to
draw general conclusions. It is to be expected
that, if the official sector were to adhere firmly
to the criteria of the exceptional access
framework, countries might be faced with the
need for a standstill more often. On the other
hand, more predictability and consistency on
the part of the official sector in implementing
the overall crisis management framework
might provide incentives for debtors and
private creditors to participate in early
constructive dialogue.
18 There is also considerable experience of standstills in the
context of restructuring debt to bilateral official creditors
(which is not relevant in the context of PSI). Paris Club
reschedulings, which started in 1956, typically involve a
standstill – i.e. the country will not pay the debt to be
rescheduled and sovereign creditors will not press their claims
– in the period between a Paris Club agreement and the
ensuing bilateral agreements. Before approaching the Paris
Club for a rescheduling, a country might have stayed up-to-
date with its obligations or might have already accumulated
arrears.
19 Some examples of bondholder committees can be found in the
period before the Second World War. For instance, Romania
reached an agreement with various bondholder committees on
the term and conditions of a standstill in 1932.
20 Other bond exchanges were completed without the countries
suspending payments (e.g. Pakistan is mentioned as a case in
which the credible threat of default – given the Paris Club’s
insistence on the comparable treatment clause – contributed to
the successful restructuring of the bonds), and are therefore
not regarded as standstill cases.18
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CAPITAL CONTROLS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR
CRISIS RESOLUTION
The imposition of capital controls may be
considered as a coercive version of private
sector involvement or as an accompanying tool
to other instruments. Such controls aim to
curtail capital flight and thus strengthen a
country’s external financing position. In some
cases, capital controls may boil down to a
forced payment suspension by private financial
or non-financial debtors. Technically, the
controls can apply to both capital account and
foreign currency transactions.
Countries where capital controls have been
implemented to restrict capital movements
include Malaysia, Russia and Ukraine. In
Malaysia, capital controls were introduced in
September 1998, in conjunction with the shift
to a fixed exchange rate regime, in order to
eliminate offshore trading of the Malaysian
ringgit and thus to curb speculative pressures
on the exchange rate. These controls did not
prevent either the Malaysian government or
private debtors from staying current on their
foreign obligations. The Malaysian strategy is
frequently seen as an alternative to IMF
financing, as, contrary to other Asian crisis
countries, it did not resort to an IMF supported
programme.
In Russia, the restrictions on capital and
current account transactions, introduced in
June 1998 at the height of the financial crisis,
assumed an extreme form, as all legal entities
(banks and non-banks) were explicitly
forbidden to service their external debt.
Subsequently, Russia restructured its rouble
denominated debt falling due between August
1998 and December 1999, equivalent to more
than 10% of GDP. In addition, Russia was
unable to meet its obligations on Soviet-era
debt to official and private sector creditors, and
accumulated substantial arrears to Paris and
London Club creditors. The Russian default
was unprecedented, as no other country in
recent history had defaulted on a bond
denominated in local currency and subject to
local law.
In Ukraine, capital controls were tightened in
the second half of 1998 in response to an
intensification of short-term capital outflows
triggered by the Russian crisis. However,
controls were not extended to the servicing of
external debt. Ukraine entered an IMF
extended fund facility in September 1998. One
of the conditions of the programme – tight net
international reserves floors – prevented net
payments of principal to private creditors,
leading Ukraine to start negotiations with its
creditors. Ukraine’s debt restructuring took
place in four stages between 1998 and 2000 and
covered debt for an amount of 9% of GDP.
Capital controls can theoretically be useful in
temporarily easing external financing
constraints, and may be a useful tool
accompanying other instruments. In practice,
however, evidence suggests that capital
controls have not been effective in stemming
capital outflows and allowing for a faster
recovery. In the case of Malaysia it is
sometimes suggested that capital controls had
an effect on both the size and composition of
capital flows, which allowed the government to
take stimulatory action in order to avoid large
output losses. However, an alternative
explanation to Malaysia’s superior
performance relative to other Asian economies
that did not impose capital controls (e.g. South
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) can be given by
its stronger fundamentals (smaller foreign debt
and a sounder banking sector) and measures
that were taken prior to the crisis (such as limits
on bank’s net foreign currency positions and
fiscal consolidation). In the case of Russia, it is
possible that the imposition of capital controls
gave the authorities some breathing space,
although the recovery of the Russian economy
was mainly attributed to a marked rise in oil
prices, exchange rate adjustment and strict
macroeconomic policies.
The imposition of capital controls in the cases
of Malaysia and Ukraine did not imply
significant losses for private creditors, as
debtors remained current on their obligations.
By contrast, in Russia capital controls were19
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more coercive in encouraging private sector
involvement, as the measures implemented
contributed to the default of many Russian
banks and corporations on their foreign
obligations. However, there is no indication
that restrictions on capital flows had long-
lasting effects in terms of capital market access
for any of the three countries analysed.
PRIVATE CONTINGENT CREDIT LINES
Private contingent credit lines are standing
credit lines with private banks, upon which
countries are entitled to draw in the event of a
crisis (defined in terms of contractually agreed
triggers). Such instruments, which are
negotiated before financial difficulties arise,
are aimed at countering capital shortages
during financial crises through the provision of
additional funds. By helping to overcome
liquidity problems, such credit lines could also
decrease the incentives for other investors to
withdraw their funds, thereby strengthening
confidence and helping to forestall crises.21
There are only few examples of countries that
have negotiated private contingent credit lines.
Among them are Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia
and South Africa.22. In December 1996, 13
foreign banks entered into an agreement with
Argentina to lend up to USD 6.1 billion against
collateral at a premium of 30 basis points over
LIBOR for a certain commitment fee.23 The
negotiated credit line was to be collateralised
through government securities. The private
credit line was activated in August 2001, at the
height of the Argentinean crisis, in conjunction
with an IMF package, but was too limited to
prevent default. This was attributed to the fact
that many of the government securities
provided as collateral had been retired from the
market as a result of an earlier debt exchange,
which reduced the private credit line to
approximately USD 1.5 billion.
Mexico established a USD 2.5 billion credit
line in November 1997, according to which the
interest rate would rise both after drawing and
in the event of credit downgrades. When the
country decided to draw on its credit line in the
wake of the Russian crisis, banks exerted
strong pressure on the authorities not to use it.
Implicitly, banks resented having to provide
funding at low pre-committed spreads at a time
when spreads for Mexico and other emerging
market countries were much higher. Mexico
went ahead regardless and yields on the
country’s debt rose by 100 basis points in the
immediate aftermath, but quickly fell back.
While private credit lines can, in principle,
provide a safeguard against adverse
developments, the limited experience so far
suggests that private contingent credit lines
may have to be designed differently to become
an attractive instrument. In their present state,
private contingent credit lines will typically be
drawn upon in times when a country is unable
to access equivalently priced financing from
other sources, owing to a general aversion to
emerging market risk or to a decline in the
country’s creditworthiness. The result is an
increase in bank exposures to borrowers at
precisely the time when they are seeking to
reduce them.
The limited use of private credit lines so far can
be attributed to several factors: (i) dynamic
hedging, i.e. when a country draws on the credit
line, financial institutions may decide to
reduce their other exposure to the country or
even to the same category of countries, which
might lead to contagion effects (this problem
can be reduced to a certain extent if the credit
line is collateralised as in the case of
Argentina); (ii) restrictive conditions under
which the line could be drawn upon; and (iii)
rigid fee and spread structures which do not
21 See also IMF (1999b).
22 The cases of Indonesia and South Africa are not in detail, due
to the limited information available.
23 The World Bank provided a contingent loan of USD 505.5
million in November 1998 (as part of a special structural
adjustment loan) to support the private credit line. The World
Bank loan could only be drawn together with the private credit
line and proceeds would be made available to the central bank
or used to meet margin calls and provide collateral. The loan
was aimed at reducing the probability of default by Argentina
on its contingent borrowing, thereby making the private
contingent credit line more attractive to lenders and less
costly.20
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allow for adjustments in accordance with the
country’s credit rating.
2.3 THE INVOLVEMENT OF DOMESTIC
CREDITORS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
FINANCIAL CRISIS (SEE ALSO ANNEX 5)
– As outlined at the start of this paper, private
sector involvement refers to contributions
by foreign private creditors and therefore
concerns, by definition, transactions
between resident debtors and non-resident
creditors. Nevertheless, domestic creditors
may also play an important role in crisis
resolution. In most cases, the payment
difficulties of sovereign debtors concern not
only obligations to external creditors, but
also obligations to domestic creditors. The
behaviour of domestic agents is also
important as they might trigger capital flight
and, in particular countries with high
informal dollarisation, currency
substitution, with potentially destabilising
effects on the balance of payments position.
The precise effect of currency substitution
will depend on the exchange rate regime. In
fixed exchange rate regimes currency
substitution directly impacts foreign
reserves, while in flexible exchange rate
regimes it leads to wide fluctuations in the
exchange rate, which, in cases of external
debt vulnerabilities, can trigger or magnify a
capital account crisis.
– The sovereign will in general enjoy greater
flexibility to involve domestic creditors in
crisis resolution through its general law-
making and regulatory powers. The array of
tools include unilateral restructuring of
domestic debt, suspension of payments, the
imposition of “bank holidays” or deposit
freezes, moral suasion to absorb public debt,
capital controls, and the asymmetric
conversion to domestic currency of banks
assets and liabilities in highly dollarised
economies.
– The implementation of measures to involve
domestic creditors in crisis resolution and
the assessment of their effect is complicated
by two main factors. First, the involvement
of domestic creditors is difficult to
disentangle from that of foreign creditors.
With the opening of capital markets, the
distinction between foreign and domestic
creditors is becoming increasingly blurred.
Domestic investors have access to debt
instruments issued by the sovereign under
domestic and foreign jurisdiction; likewise,
foreign investors can buy instruments issued
under local law. In addition, given the surge
of financial FDI, international banks may
play the role of both external and domestic
creditors (through local branches and
subsidiaries).24 Second, the involvement of
domestic creditors is difficult to disentangle
from the notion of domestic adjustment, as
in both cases the burden is ultimately borne
by residents and is not limited to banks or
their shareholders.25
Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Turkey are
examples of countries where domestic
creditors constituted an important part of the
creditor base. The following aspects,
concerning measures to involve the domestic
private creditors in these countries, are worth
highlighting:
– The negative impact of domestic private
sector involvement on the fragilities of
banking systems and on the domestic
24 In this context considering DPSI and external PSI in isolation
may be misleading to the extent that international creditors
tend to manage country risk on a consolidated basis. Crisis
resolution measures aimed at domestic banks partly or fully
owned by international institutions may actually aggravate
problems in the short run if the parent company reacts by
reducing its exposure to the country concerned. Additionally,
anecdotal evidence suggests that crisis situations may induce
some discrimination against domestic banks owned by non-
residents with regard to their access to central bank liquidity
or to other government initiatives to restore the soundness of
the financial system.
25 DPSI measures can have a large impact on the solvency of
domestic banks by affecting the value of both their assets and
liabilities. When losses exceed the banks’ capital, the costs
may affect depositors and taxpayers (as the government tries
to re-capitalise distressed banks). Furthermore, a unilateral
restructuring of domestic debt normally imposes a cost on
present and future pensioners, to the extent that pension funds,
given limited investment opportunities, invest a large share of
their portfolios in government securities.21
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economy imposes a trade-off on
policymakers between preserving the
stability of the banking system and avoiding
external sovereign default. Contributions by
the domestic banking system to alleviate
sovereign debt could be counterproductive,
as they may lead to solvency problems in the
banking system. Experience suggests that
when the crisis originates in the banking
sector (Ecuador and Turkey), the objective
of preserving the banking system is given
immediate priority. Conversely, when the
banking system is sound at the outset of a
crisis, as was the case in Argentina,
policymakers are more tempted to involve
the banks in restructuring domestic debt
prior to seeking a restructuring of external
obligations.
– Policymakers tend first to exhaust their
options for involving domestic creditors in
crisis resolution (e.g. the “mega-swap”,
“patriotic bond” and the capital controls in
Argentina) before resorting to external
default. By contrast, after external default,
the authorities tend to be more lenient with
domestic creditors than with foreign
creditors (e.g. in Ecuador the debt
restructured with domestic creditors implied
a reduction of net present value of 9%,
compared with a 35% cut for foreign
creditors).22
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3 LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Ensuring the involvement of private sector
creditors is crucial to ensure an effective
management and orderly resolution of financial
crises in emerging market economies. The
increasing share of private capital flows to
those economies and the scarcity of official
finance imply that the private sector has a key
role in resolving emerging market financial
crises. It also appears to be an issue of
effectiveness and equity to impose the costs of
a large-scale financial crisis partly covered by
the official sector also on the private sector,
including foreign creditors who have enjoyed
higher returns and must thus bear some risk.
Excluding such involvement ex ante would
make the timely and orderly resolution of
situations of financial distress much more
difficult and would distort risk-taking
decisions in financial markets. Private sector
involvement is therefore key for the efficient
financing of global financial markets. The
international community has taken several
steps towards defining a crisis resolution
framework that acknowledges the role of
private sector creditors. An important step was
taken at the IMF and World Bank Annual
Meetings in Prague (2000), where the IMFC
envisaged such involvement either on a
voluntary basis or through debt restructuring.
In practice, however, the international
community continued to extend large support
packages, thus relying on a catalytic role of
Fund engagement, expecting that it would
trigger stronger commitment by the private
sector, even in those cases where, with
hindsight, timely engagement of voluntary or
encouraged private sector involvement would
have been more appropriate. This problem was
addressed through the establishment of clear
criteria for IMF lending above predefined
limits (exceptional access framework) in 2002/
2003.  If implemented rigorously, this should
prevent over-reliance on official lending and
increase the role of the private sector in crisis
resolution. As such, it constitutes an important
complement to the Prague framework, even
though its application has so far proven
difficult. In conclusion, it would therefore
seem that further progress is required in
implementing the existing framework for crisis
resolution.
Past experience with the role of the private
sector in the resolution of financial crises
shows that, in certain cases, the existing
instruments have successfully contributed to
minimising the economic disruptions caused
by crises. However, the effective use of these
instruments requires predictable and strong
commitment of all parties involved:
– Role of the sovereign debtor: The success of
private sector involvement depends to a
significant extent on the country’s economic
fundamentals and its track record prior to the
crisis, underscoring the importance of
effective surveillance and crisis prevention.
Success also hinges on the country’s resolve
to implement necessary domestic
adjustment measures. The track record and a
credible commitment to strong domestic
adjustment helps convince private creditors
that problems will be short-lived and that
their interests will be best served by
maintaining exposure to the country.
– Role of “good conduct” on the part of the
debtor and creditors: A transparent process
providing for early dialogue between a
debtor and its creditors might help to secure
private sector involvement, whether to
prevent a liquidity problem from developing
into a full-scale crisis or to foster a smooth
restructuring of unsustainable debt. Good
faith actions by both parties are fostered
through the Principles for Stable Capital
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in
Emerging Markets recently agreed between
some emerging market issuers and some
private sector representatives.
– Role of the IMF: In addition to the critical
role played by IMF surveillance in crisis
prevention, the IMF plays a key role in crisis
situations. First, accurate and timely
diagnosis by the IMF of a country’s23
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vulnerabilities helps identify at an early
stage the need for private sector
involvement. In this context, the objectivity
and overall quality of the IMF’s debt
sustainability analysis is key. Second, a
consistent implementation of the
exceptional access framework and the
lending into arrears policy helps secure the
involvement of private creditors. This will
not only reduce moral hazard and provide
the right incentives for debtors and private
creditors, but also safeguard the IMF’s own
resources. Third, by advising on
macroeconomic policies and setting
realistic targets as part of an adjustment
programme, the IMF has an impact on the
negotiations between the debtor country and
its creditors. It should, however, refrain
from micromanaging them, not least
because of its own creditor status.
– Role of ministries of finance and central
banks in creditor countries. Experience
suggests that the authorities of key creditor
and debtor countries have an important role
to play in conducting mutual surveillance,
maintaining a close policy dialogue, and
promoting orderly crisis resolution. These
authorities can also contribute to a steady
flow of information that is one of the critical
elements in crisis resolution.
Turning to the specific instruments for
involving the private sector, the following
aspects can be highlighted:
– Bond exchanges have proved to be suitable
instruments for resolving sovereign debt
crises. Even with a more widespread
inclusion of Collective Action Clauses,
bond exchanges might be useful to replace
several instruments by one new bond issue,
rather than changing the terms of each
outstanding bond. A combination of the two
instruments, i.e. Collective Action Clauses
and bond exchanges, is likely to be used in
future cases at least until other mechanisms
for aggregating bond issues are found.
– The success of rollover agreements on short-
term bank loans in stemming currency and
banking crises depends on a number of
factors: (i) timely action to avoid large
outflows prior to the rollover agreement, (ii)
a country’s prior track record and its
commitment to an effective reform
programme, (iii) efficient crisis
management by the debtor country,
including disclosure of information to
reduce collective action problems, and (iv)
the extent to which the international
community is willing to exert moral suasion
on the creditor banks. Moral suasion may be
warranted in cases involving systemic risks.
However, given potential conflicts of
interest for central banks in creditor
countries, to the extent that they are
responsible for financial stability, their
preparedness to exert moral suasion will
depend on the circumstances of the country
concerned and the likely implications for the
international financial system.
– Standstills may be helpful in cases of
sovereign debt servicing problems, as they
allow time to be gained to reach an
agreement on a more comprehensive
restructuring arrangement or to implement
an adjustment programme that helps to
restore confidence. At the same time, the
expectation of a standstill may bring
forward a dash for the exit by creditors. So
far, the experience with standstills on
sovereign bonds is too limited to draw
general conclusions. Sovereign debtors that
suspended payments on their bonds before
launching a bond exchange took longer to
finalise the restructuring process, which
might be seen as an indication of greater
difficulties. However, they achieved higher
debt reduction rates than the bond exchanges
negotiated pre-default. A strict application
of the exceptional access framework would
affect the recourse to standstills and the
willingness of creditors and debtors to
participate in a constructive dialogue.24
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– The experience with capital controls is not
conclusive. In principle, the imposition of
restrictions on capital outflows might
prevent capital flight in a crisis and thus
provide the government with breathing
space to implement macroeconomic policies
aimed at a faster recovery. In addition, they
might complement other measures.
Nevertheless, when considering the
usefulness of capital controls several
caveats have to be borne in mind. First, the
relatively sharp recovery in some countries
that have imposed controls (e.g. Malaysia)
appears to reflect sound fundamentals and
timely policy action, rather than the positive
effect of controls. Second, capital controls
are not always watertight and can prove
unsuccessful in stemming capital outflows.
Third, once controls have been introduced,
authorities may be faced with an exit
problem and may delay their lifting for too
long, with ensuing costs in terms of
efficiency and resource allocation.
– Private contingent credit lines are likely to
play a limited role in providing countries
with effective insurance in the event of
sovereign debt servicing problems. The
main difficulty with this instrument is the
dynamic hedging problem, leading creditors
to cut back their overall exposure, in that,
and similar countries, at the time of drawing.
However, experience with market-
consistent innovations to address
borrowers’ insurance needs commercially is
still at an infant stage. The international
financial institutions should stimulate
research and encourage the private sector to
explore alternative insurance-based or
derivatives-based solutions to overcome
sovereign liquidity problems.
Finally, the restoration of sovereign debt
sustainability often requires domestic creditors
to bear a part of the adjustment burden.
However, asking for the involvement of
domestic creditors may negatively affect
domestic banking systems and the domestic
economy at large. Policymakers may therefore
be confronted with a trade-off between the
preservation of a sound banking system and the
involvement of domestic creditors in an
attempt to avoid external default. In general,
policymakers tend to first exhaust their options
for involving domestic creditors in crisis
resolution before resorting to external default.
Evidence suggests, however, that it often
proves unsuccessful to force domestic
creditors to bear losses in an attempt to avoid
default on international sovereign obligations.
Hence, a comprehensive crisis resolution
strategy, in which both foreign and domestic
private sector creditors need to be taken into
account, is warranted.
Overall, the review of experience gained in
past financial crises suggests that crisis
management practices have been largely
following a case-by-case approach. This
necessarily leads to uncertainty about how the
official sector addresses different types of
crises, which in turn might partially account for
the very mixed results achieved so far. From a
global welfare perspective, the resolution of
international financial crises is too costly and
takes too long. Efforts to improve
predictability of crisis resolution processes –
through guiding debtor, creditor and official
sector behaviour – could lower overall costs of
such crises and bring about a distribution of
these costs among all parties involved that is
likely to be seen as more appropriate from a
general welfare perspective. In this regard,
continued work to improve the framework for
the resolution of international financial crises
remains important.25
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IMPLICATIONS Table 1 Survey of literature on moral hazard





To test whether 
emerging markets’ 
bond spreads 
declined after the 
Mexican crisis as 
a result of creditor 
moral hazard.
EME bond spreads 
regressed (OLS) on 
fundamentals, a measure 
of international liquidity 
and a post-Mexico 
dummy.
Regression performed 
with quarterly Eurobond 
and Brady bond spreads 
for eight EMEs from 
1/1992 to 2/1997.
Post-Mexico dummy is 
insigniﬁ  cant, suggesting 
that Mexican crisis did 
not increase creditor 
moral hazard.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) 
hold that Mexican crisis is 
unsuited for test, because 
it was the ﬁ  rst crisis of its 
kind, waking up investors 





To assess whether 
news related to 
the availability of 
IMFsupport moves 
EME bond spreads 
as an indication of 
changes in creditor 
moral hazard.
Taking 2, 3, 5 and 10 day 
windows around news 
event, L&P examine the 
ratio of change in spreads 
to the standard deviation 
of spreads.
Based on daily EMBI 
and country spread 
data, the focus is on 22 
events between 1994 
and 1999 with news 
about IMF programs or 
the availability of IMF 
support.
Overall, little indication 
of moral hazard. Only 
the Russian default in 
1998 increased spreads 
signiﬁ  cantly, suggesting 
a reduction in creditor 
moral hazard.
Short term impact of 
events on spreads is 
difﬁ  cult to determine, 
as spreads are highly 
volatile at the peak of a 




whether EME bond 
spreads and capital 
inﬂ  ows show 
patterns consistent 
with creditor moral 
hazard in response 
to the Mexican 
crisis.
Empirical models are 
used to gain insight in 
behaviour of EME bond 
spreads and capital 
inﬂ  ows. Deviations 
between model 
predictions and reality 
contain information about 
moral hazard.
Models for EMBI 
spreads and capital 
inﬂ  ows estimated with 
respectively monthly and 
quarterly data from 1992 
to 2001.
Analysis of spreads 
provides no indication 
of moral hazard, but 
capital ﬂ  ows to EMEs are 
found to have exceeded 
predicted levels in 
1996-97, suggesting (the 
temporary occurrence) of 
moral hazard.
Mexican crisis may not 
be suited to analyse 
moral hazard (see 




Test whether the 
Russian default 




based on tests 
related to bond 
spreads
Test whether Russian 
crisis made spreads: 
1) more sensitive to 
fundamentals (maximum 
likelihood estimation 
of pre- and post-crisis 
model); 2) signiﬁ  cantly 
higher (correcting for 




12/2000 from 2 data sets: 
1) EMBIG weighted daily 
bond spreads from 21 
EMEs and 2) Bondware 
launch spreads from 54 
countries.
Spreads generally 
become more sensitive 
to fundamental (often 
signiﬁ  cantly so), 
increased signiﬁ  cantly 
and became more 
dispersed. All these 
results provide (strong) 
indications of reduction 
in creditor moral hazard 
after Russian default.
Several robustness 
checks conﬁ  rm results 
with respect to Russian 
default. Tests also 
performed with respect 
to Asian and Mexican 
crisis, but results do 




To test whether 
spreads on 
syndicated 
loans to EMEs 
declined after the 
Mexican crisis, 
as an indication 
of creditor moral 
hazard
Spreads on syndicated 
loans regressed on 
fundamentals, a measure 
of international liquidity 
and (post-Mexico) time 
dummies. Model also 
estimated for different 
debtor groups (e.g. 
banks).
Sample of 2360 term 
loans to 23 emerging 
markets from 1/1991 to 
11/1997 
Spreads on inter-
bank loans declined 
after Mexican crisis, 
suggesting creditor 
moral hazard. However, 
results from analysis 
of loans to ﬁ  n. ﬁ  rms 
and corporations are 
inconclusive
As only spreads on 
loans to banks show an 
unexplained decline 
after 1995, these results 
might highlight moral 
hazard from government 





Test of creditor 
moral hazard 
focussed on 
the response of 
creditor banks’ 
market value to 
IMF intervention 
events.
Pooled OLS regressions, 
to test if creditor banks’ 
market value (corrected 
for stock market 
movements) responds to 
IMF intervention events 
in a 5 day window.
Data on share price 
response of seven UK 
banks – exposed to EMEs 
– to 26 IMF intervention 
events between 1995 and 
2002.
Shares of banks 
exposed in EMEs often 
signiﬁ  cantly outperform 
the market in response 
to announcements of 
sizable IMF loans, with 
banks most exposed to 
EMEs showing the largest 
out performance. This 
supports the creditor 
moral hazard hypothesis
The authors’ starting 
point is that if IMF-
interventions increase 
the value of banks’ 
investments in EMEs, 
this encourages further 







news about IMF 
programmes 
causes temporary 
declines in EME 




Country speciﬁ  c 
spreads regressed 
(OLS and GARCH) on 
fundamentals, measure 
of international liquidity 
and dummies for IMF 
events (announcement of 
negotiations and program 
approval in Thailand, 
Korea and Indonesia).
Daily bond spreads for 
Korea (5/1996-2/2003) 
and Indonesia (12/1996-
2/2003). Daily data on 
fundamentals: only stock 
prices and exchange rates.
Announcements about 
an IMF programme 
inﬂ  uence only the bond 
spreads of the program 
country, not those of other 
countries. This indicated 
a limited – non sequential 
– form of creditor moral 
hazard
Dreher (2004) reports 
some methodological 
drawbacks (e.g. no 
adequate control for 
fundamentals; not clear 
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ANNEX 1
CATALYTIC EFFECTS OF OFFICIAL FINANCING*
1 DEFINITION OF CATALYTIC EFFECTS26
Although various definitions of the catalytic
effects of official financing exist in academic
literature, the most comprehensive one is that
of Cottarelli and Giannini (2002). According to
the authors, “the IMF’s involvement in a crisis
has a catalytic effect to the extent that the
announcement of an economic programme
backed up by a limited amount of IMF
resources (as compared to the size of potential
capital outflows) increases the propensity of
private investors to lend to the country
concerned, thereby reducing the adjustment
burden falling on the debtor country.”
According to this definition, the catalytic
effect of IMF lending has three key features:
– First, it is intended to encourage the
resumption of spontaneous private capital
flows into the debtor country. As pointed out
by Cottarelli & Giannini (2002), the
spontaneous nature of such flows “means
that catalytic official finance should be
distinguished from other potential ways of
addressing unstable capital flows, ranging
from direct interventions (suspension of
payments or capital controls) to milder
actions (moral suasion, concerted lending),
which have also found application at the
international level in recent times.” Such
actions, which fall into the realm of PSI,
induce non-spontaneous flows in the sense
that they are directly and explicitly aimed at
changing the size and/or composition of
capital flows. Instead, the catalytic effect
relates to spontaneous flows because such
flows are solely the result of a change in
investors’ expectation associated with the
presence of the IMF as a provider of a “good
housekeeping” seal of approval, as a
delegated monitor of the conditions in the
debtor country, as an inducer of a change in
that country’s policies (conditionality) and/
or as a provider of financial resources.
ANNEXES
– Second, it alleviates the burden of domestic
adjustment for the debtor country to the
extent that it contributes to the closing of the
financing gap and that it reduces the cost of
capital by helping to induce a narrowing of
market spreads.27
– Third, to be catalytic in nature the amount of
resources committed by the IMF has to be
small relative to the volume of capital flows
that it catalyses, enabling the international
community to close a potentially large
financing gap through the mobilisation of a
relatively small amount of official finance.
Together with the second feature mentioned
above, this explains why catalytic finance
was included among the crisis resolution
pillars of the Prague framework.
The Cottarelli and Giannini definition
concentrates on the catalytic effects of IMF
programmes in the area of crisis resolution.
Other contributions have extended this concept
to the area of crisis prevention, considering the
possibility that the presence of a precautionary
arrangement increases the volume of capital
inflows to the country concerned. This annex
makes reference to empirical contributions on
the catalytic role of the IMF both in the area of
crisis resolution and in the area of crisis
prevention.
2 REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCE
The concept of catalytic official finance (COF)
has gradually emerged over the last three
* Prepared by Javier Díaz Cassou (Banco de España).
26 This annex is based on Díaz Cassou, García Herrero and
Molina Sánchez (2005) “New Evidence on the Catalytic Role
of the IMF”, mimeo, to be circulated soon.
27 Although this is independent of the catalytic effect itself, IMF
lending also helps to reduce the country’s cost of capital
because it constitutes a cheaper source of capital than the
market. The fact that, especially in the midst of a crisis, the
interest rate attached to an IMF programme is significantly
lower than the market rate does not necessarily mean that IMF
programmes are conceded at a concessionary rate. Instead, it
has been argued that this is a result of the preferred creditor
status of the IMF, which implies a lower risk in its lending
operations.27
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decades,28 but it has only occupied a prominent
position in the policy debate agenda since the
capital account crises of the 1990s. We will
therefore concentrate on the contributions that
followed the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995.
Applying a variety of methodologies, three
major approaches have been developed to test
the hypothesis of the catalytic role of the IMF:
1) statistical analyses of capital inflows, 2)
statistical analyses of spreads and 3) case
studies. Table 1 summarises the main
contributions. Overall, the empirical evidence
to support the theory that the IMF has a broad-
based catalytic effect on private capital flows is
weak, and some studies even find that IMF
programmes could actually promote capital
outflows. It has been repeatedly pointed out,
however, that the existing literature has certain
methodological shortcomings that may have
been addressed only partially. Some of these
methodological shortcomings could tend to
bias the results of the analyses towards a
smaller catalytic effect. The following
methodological shortcomings stand out in
particular:
– First, a common problem in the empirical
literature on international capital flows is
the  poor quality of existing data,
especially in emerging markets, which may
limit the reliability of the results of
empirical analyses.
– Second, there is the problem of defining a
valid counterfactual, i.e. a valid benchmark
against which to compare actual capital
flows after the concession of an IMF
programme.29 This is a complicated issue
because it is impossible to know how net
capital inflows would have evolved in the
absence of an IMF programme, especially
during a capital account crisis.
– Third, a methodological shortcoming which
has been difficult to solve is the sample
selection problem. On one hand, there is
evidence that countries entering an IMF
programme are weaker from the start,
thereby attracting less capital inflows. On
the other hand, there are different degrees of
access to international financial markets, so
some countries provide a better basis than
others to test the catalytic role of the IMF.
– Finally, it has been pointed out that the
dynamic specifications of the empirical
contributions on the catalytic role of the IMF
are weak or non-existent in most
contributions, thus failing to consider the
possibility of different time horizons in the
catalytic role played by the IMF.
Despite these limitations, it must be
emphasised that some studies do find evidence
of a catalytic effect in certain circumstances.
Eichengreen and Mody (2001) found that the
catalytic effect of the IMF is more likely to be
observed when dealing with countries with
intermediate credit ratings. In countries with
good credit ratings the concession of an IMF
programme may actually send a negative signal
to the market, drawing attention to the
existence of problems that had not been
foreseen. In countries with low credit ratings
the concession of an IMF programme may not
be enough to convince the market about the
chances of overcoming existing problems.
However, the market is aware of the existence
of certain moderate problems in countries with
intermediate ratings and, in this context, the
concession of an IMF programme may reassure
investors that such countries are implementing
the correct policies in order to overcome these
problems. Eichengreen and Mody also found
that when programmes are associated with
limited structural conditions the catalytic
effect tends to be stronger, reflecting the fact
that investors are aware of the difficult
28 The first contribution usually identified in the literature is the
short paper prepared by the US Treasury in 1977 as
background for the Witteveen Facility. Other significant early
contributions include that of Bird and Orme (1981) or Killick
et al. (1991). These early contributions were not explicitly
aimed at testing the catalytic role and, instead, attempted to
assess broader aspects related to the involvement of the IMF in
developing countries.
29 This is a common problem of the empirical literature on the
impact of IMF programmes in its various dimensions.28
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implementation of certain structural reforms,
and therefore consider that in such cases the
programmes are more likely to go off track.
Mody and Saravia (2003) further develop the
idea that the catalytic effect of the IMF is likely
to depend on certain characteristics of the
countries concerned, the type of programme
and the credibility of the relationship between
the IMF and the country. They find that the
impact of IMF programmes on capital flows
tends to be much stronger in countries in which
the situation has not deteriorated too much, and
in countries that typically face a marked
volatility in their external sector (export
growth). With regard to the type of programme,
they find that precautionary arrangements and
larger programmes tend to catalyse greater
volumes of capital inflows because they signal
a strong commitment on the part of both the
country and the IMF. For the same reason, a
continued presence of the IMF in a country
helps to foster access to financial markets. At
some point in time, however, it appears that
investors start to see the duration of the IMF
presence in a country as excessive, signalling
that problems are very difficult to solve, or that
the country is not sufficiently committed to the
reforms recommended by the IMF.
Benelli (2003) finds that the size of financial
assistance tends to be negatively associated
with the deviations between actual and
projected capital inflows: the larger the IMF
programme, the larger the negative shortfall in
net capital inflows.30 He attributes this to
institutional and resources constraints within
the IMF: with larger programmes IMF staff are
bound to make more optimistic projections of
capital inflows in order to close the financing
gap of the country concerned. He also finds that
the policy adjustment is associated with lower
deviations of projected vs. actual capital flows:
when the IMF prescribes a stricter
macroeconomic conditionality, the programme
is more likely to meet the projected capital
inflow projections.
Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2004) find
that the catalytic effect tends to be stronger in
the bond market than in the bank market. They
argue that this is due to the fact that banks are
more engaged in monitoring activities as part
of their day-to-day operations, while the bond
market relies more on public information to
make assessments. In this context, the role of
the IMF as a “delegated monitor” is more likely
to manifest itself in the bond market.
Moreover, since creditor coordination
problems are more acute in the bond market,
the presence of the IMF as a potential
coordinator is more likely to have an impact on
the spreads charged on bond issues. The paper
also distinguishes between the IMF’s catalytic
potential through monitoring/commitment and
that through lending. It finds that the IMF
presence, rather than its lending, tends to lower
bond spreads at an increasing rate in countries
that have crossed the threshold of “debt
intolerance” and are thus under risk of liquidity
crises, but still face a relatively low risk of
insolvency (debt-to-GDP ratio between 30 and
55%). As the risk of insolvency increases
(debt-to-GDP ratio above 55%), the
importance of the IMF’s presence falls and,
instead, larger lending tends to improve market
access. This would imply that the relative
importance of the channels through which the
IMF may catalyse private flows (monitoring,
commitment/conditionality, lending) is
somewhat dependent on the level of
indebtedness of the debtor country.
Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004) use more
complex dynamic specifications and a longer
time horizon to analyse whether the presence of
the IMF in a country helps to increase and
stabilise capital inflows. After analysing initial
conditions they compare the behaviour of
capital flows in programme and non-
programme countries and conclude that the
30 Benelli avoids the counterfactual problem by using the IMF
staff projections contained in the MONA database as the
benchmark against which to compare actual capital flows after
the concession of a programme.29
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IMF is more likely to foster higher and more
stable inflows in countries that start from an
“intermediate” situation. In line with Mody and
Saravia (2003), they conclude that IMF
programmes do not stop the slide in capital
flows in countries with “very bad” initial
conditions, while the evidence is mixed in
countries starting from a “good” situation.
Díaz Cassou, García Herrero and Molina
Sánchez (2004) find a clear catalytic role for
precautionary arrangements and for the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF), particularly on FDI. By contrast, no
catalytic role is associated with Stand-By
Arrangements (SBAs), and a negative result is
found for SBAs/ Supplementary Reserve
Facility (SRF), implying that most
programmes with exceptional access do not
seem to foster access to financial markets.
When distinguishing between crisis countries
and non-crisis countries these results are
mitigated: the negative effect of IMF
programmes is only confirmed in the non-crisis
countries, unless the programme is declared to
be precautionary from the outset. In addition,
the case studies find that the catalytic effect can
be reduced if the size and format of the rescue
packages are inappropriate, if there is a lack of
transparency or an inappropriate
communication strategy with the market, if the
programme conditionality lacks credibility or
if there is unclear ownership of the programme.
3 ASSESSMENT
The empirical literature fails to find evidence
of a broad based catalytic effect associated
with IMF programmes, probably in part as a
result of certain methodological problems.
However, under certain circumstances related
to the type of country, the programme and the
relationship between the country and the IMF,
various studies do find a catalytic effect. For
instance, programmes with stricter domestic
adjustment or precautionary arrangements
seem more likely to catalyse private flows in
countries with intermediate credit ratings or
where the crisis is not too advanced. FDI and
bond flows are also more likely to be catalysed
by an IMF programme under certain
conditions. This sheds some light on the
conditions and circumstances under which a
programme might enjoy a greater probability of
success, to the extent that this success depends
on catalysing private capital inflows.30
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To explore the rationale 
for the existence of 
multilateral lending 
institutions in a world 
with well-developed 
international private 
capital markets, and 





capital ﬂ  ows


















No evidence of a catalytic role of 
multilateral lending institutions.
Killick (1995) To analyse the impact 
of IMF supported 
programmes in 
developing countries.
Case studies Not 
applicable
Not applicable 17 countries 
under an IMF 
programme.
No catalytic effect: only in two 
countries was the IMF programme 




To analyse the impact 
of IMF conditionality 
on a number of 
macroeconomic 
outcomes.
Case studies Not 
applicable
Not applicable 36 countries 
between 1988 
and 1992.
Catalytic effect on capital ﬂ  ows 




To examine the role 
of fundamentals as 











ﬂ  ows; long-
term private 
debt ﬂ  ows; 
sum of all 








Capital ﬂ  ows positively correlated 
to “new lending from multilateral 
sources”, suggesting the existence 
of a catalytic role.
Bird et al. 
(2000)
To assess the catalytic 
effect of multilateral 
lending institutions.
Case studies Not 
applicable
Not applicable 17 countries
1980s and 
1990s
The involvement of multilaterals 
does not guarantee an inﬂ  ow of 
capital from other sources. 
Marchesi 
(2001)
To assess the impact 
of IMF lending on the 
subsequent concession 
of a debt rescheduling.
Bivariate 
probit model.
Probit for the 
occurrence 










The adoption of an IMF 
programme facilitates the 




To examine the effects 
of IMF programmes 
and CACs on access to 




















Catalytic effect when the country 
concerned has intermediate credit 
rating and when programmes 





To assess the catalytic 
impact of IMF lending, 
drawing a distinction 
between types of capital 
ﬂ  ow, and types of IMF 
programme.
Panel data Net FDI/
GDP; ofﬁ  cial 
ﬂ  ows/GDP; 
portfolio 








the country’s past 




No broad-based evidence of a 
catalytic effect. SBAs have a 
positive effect on FDI in middle-
income countries and a negative 
effect on portfolio ﬂ  ows. ESAFs/
PRGFs have a negative effect 
on FDI.
Ghosh et al. 
(2002)
To look at the experience 
of eight IMF-supported 
programmes during the 
capital account crises of 
the 1990s.
Case studies Not 
applicable
Not applicable Eight 
countries
1990s
The catalytic effect on which the 





To assess the delegated 

















prolonged use of 
IMF resources.
3 066 bond 
issuances
1991-2000
No automatic catalytic effect 
associated with an IMF 
programme. Found only under 
certain conditions relating to the 
country, the programme and the 
relationship between the country 
and the IMF.31
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To assess the 
catalytic effect of 
IMF programmes on 
portfolio ﬂ  ows and 
FDI, distinguishing 









ﬂ  ow/GDP 
ratios.




IMF lending has a negative effect 
on both portfolio ﬂ  ows and FDI 
regardless of the type of facility.
Benelli (2003) To compare actual 
capital ﬂ  ows and 
IMF projections after 
the concession of a 
programme.
Panel data. Net private 
capital ﬂ  ows.
Takes into account 
the size of and 
the adjustment 
induced by the 
programmes.
105 SBA 
and 31 EFF 
programmes.
Actual capital ﬂ  ows fall short of 
projections in larger programmes 
and in countries with access 
to capital markets. Policy 
adjustments are associated with 





To contrast the catalytic 
role of the IMF in 
the bond market and 
in bank lending; to 
consider the level of 
external solvency; and 
to distinguish between 


















Loan and bond 
transactions. 
Takes into account 
external debt/GDP 
ratio. 
6 700 loan 
transactions, 
3 500 bond 
transactions
1991-2002
Stronger catalytic effect in 
the bond market than in bank 
lending. Catalytic effect 
correlated to the country’s level 
of external solvency. When a 
country faces liquidity risks 
but not insolvency risk it is the 
presence of the IMF rather than 
its lending which catalyses 
private ﬂ  ows. Instead, when 
countries face insolvency risk it 
is the volume of lending, rather 
than the presence of the IMF 




To study over a longer 
term horizon whether 
IMF programmes have 
helped countries to 
gain or regain access 
to international capital 
markets and, if so, 
through which channels; 
and to explore the role 














loan ﬂ  ows.
Excludes SAF/
ESAF/PRGF 
from the analysis. 
Distinguishes 





After a dip IMF programmes 
contribute to an improvement 
of capital inﬂ  ows to countries 








To test the existence 
of a catalytic effect 
of IMF programmes, 
taking a broad deﬁ  nition 
(on the side of crisis 
prevention and crisis 
resolution); To compare 
the econometric analysis 









capital ﬂ  ows, 
FDI, portfolio 

















Finds little empirical evidence 
of a catalytic effect for SBAs 
and EFFs. A negative effect for 
SBAs/SRFs. Some empirical 
evidence of a catalytic effect for 
precautionary arrangements and 
PRGF, particularly on FDI ﬂ  ows. 
The case studies ﬁ  nd that various 
qualitative features of the IMF 
programmes have a catalytic 
effect both with regard to crisis 
resolution and crisis prevention.
1) Extended fund facilities (EFF), structural adjustment facilities (SAF), enhanced structural adjustment facilities (ESAF).32
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SOVEREIGN DEBT THROUGH BOND EXCHANGES*
1 BACKGROUND
Since late 1998 there have been a number of
examples of sovereign bonds being
restructured. Details of seven cases are
provided in table 3.31 Four were pre-default
cases – Pakistan (1999), Ukraine (2000),
Moldova (2002) and Uruguay (2003) – and
three were post default cases – Russia (2000),
Ecuador (2000) and Argentina (2005).32
Each restructuring involved an exchange offer
in which bondholders were invited to exchange
their instruments for new longer term bonds.
However, there were significant differences in
the ways the different agreements were reached
both with regard to the legal arrangements and
with regard to the dialogue with the creditors.
2 ASSESSMENT
EXCHANGES PROVIDE A MEANS OF
RESTRUCTURING DEBT CONTRACTED IN THE
FORM OF SOVEREIGN BONDS
– These cases have demonstrated that debt
contracted in the form of sovereign bonds is
not immune to restructuring by sovereigns
facing severe financial crises. In all seven
cases it eventually proved possible to secure
agreement on restructurings that provided
immediate cash-flow relief. 33
LESSONS FROM THE CASES TO DATE ON HOW TO
MANAGE BOND EXCHANGES
– The comprehensive restructuring of
outstanding bonds appears to be more likely
to produce a debt-service profile consistent
with a return to medium-term viability than
do efforts to restructure individual
instruments in a piecemeal fashion (Ukraine
started by restructuring bonds on a
piecemeal basis prior to launching a
comprehensive exchange). In addition, a
comprehensive approach helps to make the
debtor’s strategy transparent and helps to
resolve issues concerning inter-creditor
equity, which are difficult to address on a
piecemeal basis.
– Efforts by debtors to limit the scope of
restructuring to one class of bonds while
seeking to protect another class of
instruments may pose problems of inter-
creditor equity. This may affect different
types of international bond (for example,
Ecuador tried to limit the restructuring to
Brady bonds, but decided that the eventual
success of a restructuring depended upon
broadening the scope to include Eurobonds)
as well as domestic debt (for example, in the
cases of both Russia and Ecuador foreign
investors were unwilling to show
forbearance if that meant allowing investors
holding domestic instruments to exit).
– Bond exchanges have been completed
appreciably more quickly in pre-default
* Prepared by John Drage.
31 This Annex draws upon two IMF papers: “Involving the
Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises –
Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds” of 11 January
2001 and “Reviewing the Process for Sovereign Debt
Restructuring within the Existing Legal Framework” of 1
August 2003.
32 The dates refer to when the rescheduling exercises were
completed. In the case of Argentina a restructuring process
was initiated in October 2001 under a two phase approach.
Under Phase 1 some USD 50 billion of federal and provincial
bonds were rescheduled in early December 2001. Phase 2,
covering around USD 82 billion, was eventually launched in
January 2004 and the offer was closed on 25 February 2005.
33 In the period 1980 to 1998 there were 56 incidents of sovereign
bank debt being restructured, but only four cases (Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Panama and Nigeria) of sovereign bonds being
restructured. Exchanges of new bonds for defaulted ones were
made at par and interest rates on the new instruments were
generally higher than on the original bonds, while maturities
were longer. No debt reduction was involved. (Sovereign bond
reschedulings were more common in the pre-Bretton Woods
era of cross-border capital flows.) The small number of
sovereign bond issues restructured during the 1980s, plus the
perceived difficulty of how to achieve restructuring of
sovereign bonds, led some investors to believe that in practice
bonds were de facto senior to other forms of sovereign debt to
private sector creditors. The bond reschedulings that have
occurred since 1998 have ended any perceptions that bonds
enjoy an element of seniority.33
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 32
July 2005
ANNEX 2
cases than in post default ones.34 This may
reflect a common incentive on the part of
creditors and debtors to avoid default. (An
alternative, more subtle, explanation could
be that countries choose not to launch bond
exchanges pre-default if they anticipate that
the process of agreeing a deal will be time-
consuming and difficult). However, pre-
default exchanges have to date delivered
very modest NPV reductions compared to
those achieved in post-default
restructurings.
– The IMF has a large influence over whether
and when a sovereign seeks to restructure its
private sector debt by means of an exchange.
The extent of the finance that the IMF is
prepared to make available to a country will
have a major bearing on whether it goes
down the exchange route and on the terms
that it seeks, including the size of haircut.
– While the seven cases show that bond
exchanges provide a means of restructuring
sovereign debt incurred in the form of bond
issues, a number of questions remain both
about the efficiency of bond exchanges as a
means of achieving debt restructuring and
about the sustainability of the restructurings
delivered by exchanges.
EFFICIENCY ISSUES SURROUNDING BOND
EXCHANGES AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING A DEBT
RESTRUCTURING
– While the threat of creditor litigation did not
disrupt six of the seven reschedulings, there
are now a number of cases pending against
Argentina that could complicate the
satisfactory completion of this restructuring
exercise.35
– Concerns about holdout problems can
encourage legal innovation on the debtor
side – such as the exit consents used by
Ecuador – which may have adverse ex post
effects.
– While bond exchanges provide a technical
solution to enable the creditors and debtors
to renegotiate, they do not specify the
circumstances in which a restructuring may
be appropriate or the modalities of how it
could be organised.36
– Feedback from market participants suggest
that many do not believe that the rules of the
game are sufficiently well articulated.
Given the diversity of approaches followed
by the seven countries that have attempted to
restructure their debt by means of bond
exchanges there is no clear understanding of
the process the sovereign will follow,
including whether the sovereign will enter
into negotiations or not. The varying lengths
of time needed to complete the process and
the fact the terms of restructurings have
varied considerably have further added to
this feeling of uncertainty.
34 The length of time from expressing a desire to restructure to
completion of the exchange offer in the pre-default
restructurings was 4 months for Moldova, 1 month for
Pakistan, 2 months for Ukraine, and 1.5 months for Uruguay.
For post-default restructurings the time from default to the
completion of the exchange was 11 months for Ecuador, 20
months for Russia and 38 months for Argentina. (In the 1930s,
when sovereign bond restructurings were generally settled
through negotiations between the sovereign debtor and the
bondholders, who were represented either by the British
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders or the US Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council, negotiations often took more
than five years, and even 17 years from default to final
settlement in the case of Chile.)
35 The Elliott v. Peru case may have increased the temptation for
some creditors to take the litigation route. Elliott Associates
held out when Peru restructured its external debt into Brady
bonds. It was able to exercise considerable leverage by putting
Peru in a situation where, if it had refused to pay Elliott in full,
payments intended to be made to Brady bondholders could
have been seized to service the debt due to Elliott. While the
legal basis upon which Elliott litigated its case (particularly
its reliance on the pari passu clause) is somewhat
controversial, the case illustrated that creditors can
sometimes find ways to exercise leverage on a sovereign by
putting it in a position where it might be forced to default on
payments to other creditors.
36 The same is true of CACs. It is possible that this gap may in the
future, to some degree, be filled by sovereigns and their
creditors in accordance with the recommendations contained
in the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt
Restructuring in Emerging Markets” recently agreed
between a number of sovereign issuers and some private
sector trade associations (see http://www.iif.com/press/
pressrelease.quagga?id=98).34
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ECUADOR’S DEBT RESTRUCTURING – A CASE STUDY OF A POST-DEFAULT EXCHANGE
Ecuador eventually succeeded in securing an agreement that provided for a substantial
reduction in the face value of, and medium-term burden of servicing, external debt. This
restructuring was the subject of close scrutiny by financial markets and many private creditors
expressed concern about the approach adopted by the Ecuadorian authorities, including the
absence of the regular provision of information and the limited willingness of the authorities to
engage in an open dialogue, let alone to engage in negotiations.
The Ecuador case was also notable for the imaginative use of exit consents to resolve
difficulties associated with collective action in a restructuring – the first time exit consents
have been used in a sovereign context (see below). Ecuador’s bonds did not include CACs that
could have enabled investors holding a qualified majority of principal to modify the payment
terms of their instrument in a way that would be binding on all holders of the issue. As a result,
there was a potential difficulty with investors who might decide not to participate in the
exchange offer, in the hope of being able to obtain settlement on more favourable terms later.1
Prior to exiting into the new bonds a majority of bondholders modified the terms of the original
bonds (other than those relating to payment) in a way that made the original bonds less
attractive to investors who decided not to participate in the exchange. This had the effect of
reducing the leverage of the holdout creditors.
Exit consents in bond exchanges
As a technique to encourage full creditor participation in a bond exchange, exit consents (also
known as “exit amendments”) can be used to restructure international sovereign bonds
governed by New York law which do not contain majority restructuring provisions for payment
terms. These bonds typically require unanimity to modify payment terms. They do, however,
permit a simple majority to modify (with the issuer’s consent) other bond provisions – such as
waiver of sovereign immunity, submission to jurisdiction, financial covenants and listing. Exit
consents are designed to make the bond less attractive through modification of such non-
payment provisions, thereby reducing the leverage of the holdout creditors that cannot
otherwise be bound because of the absence of a CAC.
In the context of an exchange offer, exit consents are used to allow bondholders, by tendering
bonds in the exchange, automatically to vote in favour of the amendments to certain terms of
the bonds that they are about to leave. The completion of the exchange offer is predicated on
bondholders holding the requisite majority agreeing to the amendment. Even if there were
holdouts who refused to participate in the exchange offer and therefore became a majority of
the old bond (as everyone else exited), the holdouts would not be able to reverse the
amendments without the consent of the sovereign issuer.
The amendment of some of the non-payment provisions could adversely affect the secondary
market value of the old bond after the exchange or make it more difficult for remaining holders
of the old bonds to pursue legal remedies against the sovereign issuer. For example, if the
sovereign immunity waiver were removed from the bond terms through an exit amendment,35
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holdouts would be stripped of the ability to attach the sovereign issuer’s assets (at least in those
jurisdictions recognising the amendment) in connection with a lawsuit based on the old bonds.
Such an amendment would reduce the attractiveness of the old bonds, thereby removing the
incentives for investors not to participate in the exchange offer in the hope of being able to
subsequently obtain a more favourable settlement.
For a general discussion of issues concerning exit consents, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu
Gulati, “Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges,” 48 UCLA Law Review 59 (October
2000).
1 This would be consistent with the classic behaviour of so-called vulture creditors. These creditors tend to buy distressed debt at a
steep discount and wait until the “decks have been cleared” through a restructuring before attempting to apply pressure for a
favourable settlement, in many cases, through litigation.
– The lack of clarity about the procedures that
are likely to be followed may compound the
difficulty of achieving a timely agreement.
Two issues that often arise are improving the
exchange of information between debtors
and creditors and, in cases that involve a
large and diverse group of creditors,
achieving effective coordination between
them. (These are areas where the Principles
for Stable Capital Flows may be able to help
in clarifying “the rules of the game”.)
– In addition to the private sector not having a
clear understanding of the process by which
sovereign debtors will seek to restructure
bonds, further uncertainty is created by the
lack of a clear understanding about the
approaches the IMF might be willing to
accept in the context of its policy of lending
into arrears.
– Creditors also have concerns that bond
exchanges afford sovereign debtors
experiencing stress in their external
accounts the opportunity to avoid
conducting a meaningful dialogue with their
creditors. If a country is unwilling to enter
into a dialogue, it has the option of
presenting its creditors with a “take it or
leave it” exchange offer. Creditors are then
left with the choice of whether to accept the
offer or to face the substantial uncertainties
and costs involved in trying to enforce
contractual obligations through litigation.
– A further concern for creditors is that, if
default precedes the making of an exchange
offer, the sovereign may be able to drive
down the price of its bonds by delaying
entering into negotiations or tabling an
exchange offer. The offer that is eventually
made may end up forcing substantial losses
on investors in the primary market.
– On the debtor’s side, fears that a
restructuring will impose economic and
reputational cost on the country, fears about
a sustained loss of access to international
capital markets, and concerns about
litigation risks, are all factors that may lead
to delays in initiating a bond exchange in the
hope that, with sufficient time, the country
will succeed in resolving the current crisis
without having to resort to a restructuring
(gambling for redemption).
– It is conceivable that these uncertainties
about the process for restructuring sovereign
bonds could have an adverse impact on the
volume of funds devoted to the emerging
markets assets class. US corporate bonds
and emerging market sovereign debt are
widely seen as competing asset classes (both
provide high yield, high risk instruments and36
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neither class of asset is backed by a lender of
last resort). However, the informal out-of-
court workouts of distressed corporate debt
(conducted in the shadow of bankruptcy
law) provide a predictable process for
reorganising distressed corporate debt
which facilitates the pricing of risk. Some
fund managers argue that the lack of an
established process for achieving sovereign
restructurings makes the pricing of
sovereign risk more uncertain than the
pricing of corporate risk, which in turn
makes emerging market sovereign bonds a
less attractive asset class than corporate
bonds.
DO BOND EXCHANGES DELIVER MEDIUM-TERM
DEBT SUSTAINABILITY?
Once a decision to restructure has been taken, a
number of factors affect the terms on which a
sovereign is able to achieve a collaborative
agreement with its creditors. In particular, it is
very difficult to define the appropriate
macroeconomic policy response in the midst of
a severe crisis. (There is likely to be substantial
uncertainty about key factors – including the
fiscal costs of resolving financial and corporate
sector difficulties – that have a bearing on a
debtor’s capacity to generate resources for
debt-servicing.) It is also very difficult to
assess the size of the haircut required to restore
medium-term sustainability. In such an
environment, sovereign debtors may be
unwilling to commit to an early restructuring
agreement that may need to be reopened at a
later stage. While creditors may judge that their
interests are best served by retaining the legal
status of their original claims, rather than
making concessions in the face of considerable
uncertainty about the debtor’s payment
capacity.
As noted above, pre-default exchanges tend to
be completed more quickly than post-default
exchanges, but, at the same time, have achieved
significantly smaller haircuts. This raises a
question as to whether there is a risk that pre-
default restructurings may fail to provide
durable solutions.38
It is also likely that the relative bargaining
power of creditors and debtors is changed by an
event of default. Post-default a sovereign
debtor is in a much stronger position to table a
“take-it or leave-it” exchange offer on terms it
thinks will achieve medium-term debt
sustainability.
The evidence on whether or not pre-default
exchanges can achieve sustainable solutions is
mixed. The latest IMF reports on Pakistan and
Ukraine show the external debt to GDP ratio for
these countries on a downward trend.39 The
position in respect of Moldova and Uruguay is
less clear. While Moldova’s external debt-to-
GDP ratio fell from 124% to 107% following
the exchange, and has since fallen further to
78%, the IMF is pessimistic about Moldova’s
ability to achieve external debt sustainability
without a further restructuring. In the case of
Uruguay’s bond exchange the external debt-to-
GDP ratio only fell from 101% to 96% at the
time of the exchange and the IMF’s projections
show the ratio staying around this
uncomfortably high level. The two countries
that have completed post-default exchanges,
Ecuador and Russia, achieved substantial
reductions in their debt-to-GDP ratios at the
time of the exchange and now appear to have
external debt-to-GDP ratios that are on a
downward trend.40
38 The recent Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) report on the
role of the IMF in Argentina states (paragraph 245):
“Financial engineering in the form of voluntary, market-based
debt restructuring is costly and unlikely to improve debt
sustainability if it is undertaken under crisis conditions
without a credible, comprehensive economic strategy.” The
report argues that at times of crisis such operations are
performed at interest rates significantly higher than in
“normal” times and therefore improve short-term cash flows
only at the cost of a higher debt service burden.
39 Ukraine’s external debt-to-GDP ratio fell sharply, from 33%
to 20%, following the bond exchange. While there was no
similar downward movement in Pakistan’s external debt-to-
GDP ratio at the time of the exchange, the ratio has since fallen
sharply and appears to be on a downward trend (55% at the
time of the exchange to 42% in 2003/04 and a projected 30%
by 2008/09).
40 Ecuador’s external debt to GDP ratio decreased from 72% to
42% following the exchange and Russia’s from 76 to 49%.37
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URUGUAY’S DEBT RESTRUCTURING – A CASE STUDY OF A PRE-DEFAULT EXCHANGE
Background: In the aftermath of a severe currency and banking crisis in the summer of 2002,
which was partly the result of contagion from neighbouring Argentina, the authorities were
confronted with acute debt problems. Uruguay’s total debt had escalated to about 100% of
GDP, or roughly USD 11 billion, with significant debt-service obligations falling due in 2003
and 2004. To alleviate the cash-flow pressures and help restore debt sustainability, the
authorities embarked on a voluntary debt exchange aimed at lengthening the average maturity
on the market private debt. With the assistance of financial and legal advisors and in the
context of the IMF-supported programme, the authorities prepared the first draft of a plan in
October 2002, but considered it to be insufficient to address the underlying problems. The
stabilisation of the banking system over the last months of 2002 delayed the preparation of a
revised plan. This was completed in February 2003 after a renewed bank run and further loss of
reserves in late January/early February and fears of a pending default. On the basis of the
revised plan the authorities proceeded to engage creditors in a dialogue over the debt
restructuring. The debt restructuring involved essentially three components: an external
component, covering mainly those bonds issued in Europe and the United States (all without
CACs, amounting to some USD 3.6 billion), a domestic component, covering bonds issued in
the domestic market (some USD 1.6 billion), and a Japanese component, covering Uruguay’s
Samurai bonds (USD 250 million, containing CACs). Following a period of informal dialogue
with creditors, the authorities launched the exchange on 10 April and completed it on 29 May
after a brief extension period.
The authorities’ strategy: A primary consideration for the authorities was to avoid default. In
this context their strategy was aimed at a collaborative process and a voluntary exchange. Since
time was limited, the authorities relied on informal contacts with creditors. As near-term debt-
service relief was a major consideration, bondholders were invited to swap existing bonds for
new longer maturity instruments with broadly the same face value and coupons as the old
bonds, implying an NPV reduction. To encourage high participation rates, the authorities
established a commitment to complete the offer if participation exceeded 90% (and they also
announced that the exchange would not go ahead if participation fell below 80%).
Creditor coordination: Given the time constraint for the completion of the restructuring,
inter-creditor coordination was limited. Generally, no serious inter-creditor equity issues were
raised, particularly since the debt exchange involved nearly all of Uruguay’s market debt, and
the design of the final plan took into account investors’ concerns. In addition, Uruguay’s
official bilateral debt was very small, implying that its exclusion from the exchange was not
perceived to be a problem by affected creditors.
Dialogue with creditors: The authorities actively sought to involve bondholders in an
informal consultation process. The dialogue was guided by the premise that the authorities
wished to resolve the debt situation in a voluntary and collaborative manner. The authorities
held a first round of meetings (in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Uruguay) to explain
their current situation and have creditors’ feedback on the debt restructuring offer. On the
domestic front, the authorities maintained contacts with major institutional investors. Since
domestic market participants had been exposed to the effects of the 2002 financial crisis, they38
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were generally receptive to the proposed plans. Benefiting from creditors’ input in this first
round of talks, the authorities formally launched the exchange offer on 10 April 2003. They
then proceeded to a second round of meetings with investors, this time to explain the main
features of the proposal and its consistency with the envisaged macroeconomic adjustment and
financing envelope. The authorities published the Staff Report for the Second Review under
the IMF programme, to provide further information to the public on their economic and
financial programme. They also stepped up their communication efforts through interviews
and advertisements in the local media while remaining in close contact with key investors and
analysts.
Special features of the new bonds: The new foreign-law bonds include CACs enabling
Uruguay to change the payment terms of each series of bonds with the consent of investors
representing 75% of the outstanding principal of the specific series. In addition, the new bonds
also include an “aggregation clause” allowing Uruguay to change the payment terms in more
than one series of bonds with the consent of investors representing only two thirds of
outstanding principal of each affected series, as long as there is also agreement by at least 85%
of aggregate bondholders affected by the change
Strategy to deal with holdout investors: The authorities explicitly warned that, if unable to
meet all debt-service obligations, they would service the new debt in preference to the old. In
addition, they used legal and regulatory incentives to deter non-participation. Holders
exchanging the external bonds were asked to approve exit consents, which would reduce the
ability of holders of the old bonds to enforce debt-service payments.
Results: After a short extension, the offer finally closed on 29 May, achieving participation
rates of nearly 99% on the domestic component, some 90% on the external, and 100% on the
Japanese component. Overall, participation rates reached an average of about 93%. Several
factors may have contributed to the success of the exchange: (i) realisation by investors that
Uruguay’s debt and external position were not manageable without the exchange - buttressed
by effective IMF conditionality which clearly conditioned further disbursements on
satisfactory financing assurances; (ii) a well-designed exchange offer, acceptable to a wide
range of investors while meeting financing constraints, and marketed effectively (particularly
by domestic retail intermediaries) in a cooperative approach; (iii) relative attractiveness of the
new bonds (greater liquidity) compared with the old ones (exit consents, worse regulatory
treatment); (iv) the relatively modest size of the haircut (around 20%); (v) the general rally in
emerging market debt during the exchange period; and (vi) relatively high prices on the old
bonds initially (trading at an average of around 50 cents to the dollar prior to the announcement
of the exchange) may have reduced incentives to hold out as the potential upside was limited in
the event of recovery of the old bond, either through litigation or because the old bonds were
repaid, while the downside was substantial in the event the exchange were to fail and default
were to materialise.39
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ARE BOND EXCHANGES A DURABLE MECHANISM
FOR ACHIEVING SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING?
– In five of the seven cases the value (and the
number) of bonds rescheduled was
comparatively small (the exceptions being
Argentina and Russia): the absolute amounts
of the face value of the bonds ranged from
USD 40 million for Moldova (3% of the
outstanding external debt stock) to USD 6.3
billion for Ecuador (39% of the outstanding
external debt stock).
– While, participation rates have so far been
high in six of the seven cases – Russia,
Pakistan and Ukraine were all above 99%,
Ecuador 97% (thanks to the use of exit
consents) and Uruguay 93%41 – it may prove
more difficult to achieve similar
participation rates in future. In all of these
cases the holdout creditors eventually got
paid in full and this may encourage a higher
level of holdouts in future. In the case of
Argentina the acceptance rate was 76% and
the treatment of the holdout creditors
remains unclear.
– It is possible that bond exchanges could be
vulnerable to further legal innovation on the
creditor side. While it appears that the pari
passu issue may have been resolved in a way
that does not preclude the use of bond
exchanges in the future, it is possible that
innovative lawyers may find other legal
means to undermine debt exchanges.
– The wider use of CACs could in future mean
that, as the stock of bonds without CACs
diminishes, sovereign debt reschedulings
will increasingly be achieved by amending
the terms of existing bonds, rather than
exchanging existing bonds for new ones.
41 In the case of Moldova the exchange involved a single bond
and the CACs in the bond were used to bind-in the minority
holders.40
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Table 3 Recent debt restructuring cases involving bond exchanges (based on Table 1 of the IMF paper on 









Use of CACs & 




debt at end 2001 
USD 136.7 billion, 
of which sovereign 
external bonds 
USD 49.5 billion 





foreign debt in 
late October 2001 
under a two-phase 
approach. Phase 1 
was completed in 
December 2001. 
Phase 2 eventually 
launched in 
January 2005 
(closing date of 25 
February 2005) 
Under Phase 







bonds with a 
face value of 
USD 41 billion 
and a further 
USD 9 billion in 
provincial debt. 
Under phase 2, the 
aggregate eligible 
amount was 
USD 81.8 billion 
(comprising USD 
79.7 billion of 
principal and 
USD 2.1 billion of 
accrued but unpaid 





the total amount 
to around USD 
104bn. 
Under Phase I all 
eligible US dollar 
and Argentine 
peso bonds were 
exchanged for new 
domestic loans 
with a reduction 
of interest rates 
to 70% of the 
contractual level, 
a grace period for 
interest until April 
2002, and a three 
year extension 
of maturity in 
the case of bonds 
maturing up to 
2010. 
Under phase 2 
holders can 
swap into four 
bonds maturating 
between 2033 and 
2045 including a 
GDP-linked bond. 
Computing 
haircuts for the 
phase 1 exchange 
is complicated 
by the lack of 
a secondary 







(2004) give upper 
and lower bound 
estimates of 
between 50% and 
25%. 
The phase 2 
exchange resulted 
in a hair cut of 
around 75%.
None The debt 
restructured 
in phase 1 was 
held by banks, 
local pension 
funds and local 
residents
0f the debt to 
be restructured 
in phase 2 
about 50% is 
estimated to be 
held by domestic 
ﬁ  nancial 
institutions 
(roughly equal 





3% by Japanese 
retail investors, 
and the remaining 
27% is largely 





debt at end 1999 
USD 16.3 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 6.3 





Brady bonds in 
September 1999. 
Later defaulted on 







on 27 July 2000, 
which was 











Brady bonds, and 
Eurobonds with a 
total face value of 
USD 6.5 billion.
Bondholders were 
given the option to 
swap the defaulted 
bonds into a single 
global USD-
denominated step-
up 30-year bond, 
with an option to 
convert the 30-
year bond into a 
USD-denominated 
12-year bond for 
additional debt 
reduction. The 
new bond included 
a principal 
reinstatement 
clause to reduce 
the risk of future 




resulted in a 
reduction in the 
face value of the 
bonds by USD 1.8 
billion or 27% of 
the restructured 
debt. The cash-
ﬂ  ow relief 
provided by the 
exchange equalled 
about USD 349 
million in the ﬁ  rst 
year (100%) and 
USD 506 million 
in the second year 
(71%), or about 
USD 1.5 billion in 
the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years 
(42%).
Ecuador was the 
ﬁ  rst sovereign 
to use exit 
consents to make 
the bonds less 
attractive through 
modiﬁ  cation of 
non-payment 
provisions in 
order to reduce 
the leverage of 
holdout creditors. 
Widely held by 
institutional 
investors in 
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Table 3 Recent debt restructuring cases involving bond exchanges (based on Table 1 of the IMF paper on 









Use of CACs & 




debt at end 1998 
USD 177.9 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 16.0 




loans (PRINs) in 
December 1998. 
Six months later in 
June 1999, Russia 
defaulted on its 
interest arrears 
notes (IANs). An 
agreement was 
reached with the 
Bank Advisory 
Committee on 11 






was launched on 
18 July 2000 and 




estimated at USD 
31.8 billion. 
The claims were 
composed of 
about USD 22.2 
billion of PRINS, 
USD 6.8 billion of 
IANs and USD 2.8 
billion of PDI on 
PRINs and IANs. 
The PRINs 










a 7-year grace 
period. The PDIs 
were exchanged 
for a special 10-
year Eurobond at 
par, with a 6-year 
grace period. 
The amount of 
PDI exchanged 
was equal to 
the outstanding 
amount minus a 
cash payment of 
USD 270 million. 
The exchange 
resulted in a 
reduction in the 
face value of the 
bonds by USD 
13.4 billion (of 
which PRINs and 
IANs accounted 






USD 2.5 billion 
and PDI accounted 
for USD 270 
million) or 42% 
of the restructured 
debt. The cash-
ﬂ  ow relief 
provided by the 
exchange averaged 
about USD 1.7 
billion per year 








CACs, but these 




about 70% was 
held by domestic 





debt at end 2001 
USD 1.2 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 40 





June 2002. The 
ﬁ  nal restructuring 
agreement was 
signed on 15 










balance of USD 
39.7 million, was 





an immediate cash 
payment of 10% 
of the outstanding 
principal (USD 
3.97 million) 






resulted in a 
reduction in 
the face value 
of the bonds by 
USD 4 million 
or 10% of the 
restructured debt. 
The cash-ﬂ  ow 
relief provided by 
the exchange was 
USD 33 million in 








provision was used 





the fact that 
a single asset 
management 
company 






debt at end 1998 
USD 32.3 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 685 




offer was launched 
in November 
1999 and was 
completed on 13 
December. It was 
a requirement that 
the restructuring 
should take 





with a face value 
of USD 608 
million, had bullet 
redemptions in the 
period December 
1999 to February 
2002, and coupons 
ranging from 6 
to 11.5%. One 
Eurobond had 
a put option 




exchanged for a 
new amortising 
bond with an 
overall maturity 
of six years, 
including a three 
year grace period, 
and a coupon of 
10%.
The exchange 
resulted in an 
increase in the face 
value of the bonds 
by USD 6 million. 
However, there 
was a signiﬁ  cant 
cash-ﬂ  ow relief in 
the ﬁ  rst year of the 





English law and 
contained CACs. 
But Pakistan 
chose not to make 
use of the CACs 
because they 
were concerned 






opposed to the 
restructuring.
Roughly one 
third of the 
restructured 
bonds were held 
by domestic 
residents with 
the rest held 
by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and 
retail investors 
from the Middle 
East. US and 
European 
investment ﬁ  rms 
had only small 
holdings of the 
debt. 42
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Table 3 Recent debt restructuring cases involving bond exchanges (based on Table 1 of the IMF paper on 









Use of CACs & 




debt at end 1999 
USD 14.0 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 2.3 













decided not to 
make a principal 
payment due on 
one of the bond 
issues in January 
2000 or a coupon 
payment due on 
another bond issue 
in February 2000. 
As the grace period 
of both payments 
expired while the 
exchange offer 
was still open, 
Ukraine was in 
default during the 
exchange. The 
exchange was 




Eurobonds with a 
face value of USD 
2.3 billion and 










maturities of seven 
years, including 
a grace period of 
one year. Investors 
were offered a 
choice of a euro-
denominated 
Eurobond bearing 
a coupon of 
10%, and a USD-
denominated 
Eurobond with an 
11% coupon. 
The exchange 
resulted in no 
reduction in the 
face value of 
the bonds, but 
yielded cash-ﬂ  ow 
savings of USD 
835 million in the 
ﬁ  rst year and USD 
719 million in the 
second. 




CACs, but a 
bond governed 
by German law 
did not. The use 




offer for all of 
the instruments 
with the use of 




The three bonds 
which contained 
CACs were held 
by a relatively 
limited number of 
investment banks 
and hedge funds. 
The remaining 
issue was widely 




debt at end 2002 
USD 10.7 billion, 
of which sovereign 
bonds USD 3.4 






10 April 2003 
and successfully 
completed on 
29 May 2003, 
after the deadline 
for offers was 
extended by one 
week from 22 May 





to 93% and USD 
5 billion out of 
USD 5.4 billion 




all market debt, 
accounting for 







USD 1.6 billion 
of principal, 18 
international 
bonds accounting 
for USD 3.5 











bond could be 
exchanged for a 
bond with similar 
coupon and 
extended maturity 
(generally 5 years 
longer), combined 
in some cases 
with a 30-year 
bond. Under the 
“benchmark” 
option investors 
received one of a 
smaller number 
of benchmark 
bonds, which were 
long-dated but 
more liquid than 
under the maturity 
extension option, 
also combined in 
some cases with a 
30-year bond. 
The exchange 
resulted in a 
reduction in the 
face value of the 
bonds by USD 
49 million. The 
exchange yielded 
cash-ﬂ  ow savings 
of USD 411 
million in the ﬁ  rst 
year and USD 
192 million in the 
second year, or 
about USD 1.6 
billion in the ﬁ  rst 
ﬁ  ve years. The 
NPV of future 
ﬂ  ows on new 
bonds was about 
20% less than 
the NPV of pre-
exchange ﬂ  ows, 
when discounted 
at a common 
factor (16% 
– the implied yield 
when the exchange 
was launched).
Uruguay used CAC 
provisions in the 
Samurai bond to 





it also used exit 
consents in 
connection with 
New York law 
bonds to reduce the 
old bonds’ liquidity 
and their holders’ 
ability to attach 
payments made 
on new bonds. In 
a new innovation, 
Uruguay included 
an aggregation 
clause among the 
CACs included in 
the new bonds. This 
lowers the threshold 
of outstanding 
principal required 
for consent to 
modiﬁ  cations of 
payment terms of 
individual series, if 
a larger majority of 
all affected series 
approve the change. 
More than half 
of all bonds were 
held by domestic 
investors, 
which were to 
a large extent 




bonds had a large 
retail investor 







widely held by 
institutional 
investors in the 
United States.
1) External debt data taken from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance.43
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EXPERIENCE WITH ROLLOVER AGREEMENTS*
1 INTRODUCTION
Rollover agreements are a transitional
component of PSI in crisis resolution which
should provide a bridging to sustainable
solutions, e.g. by allowing a temporary
breathing space to avoid a bank run. In a
number of recent financial crises among EMEs
there was an understanding that exceptionally
large IMF financing made available to
countries undergoing liquidity crises should be
accompanied by some kind of “voluntary PSI”,
frequently in the form of a rollover of bank
credit. In rollover agreements creditors and
debtors agree to maintain temporarily a
hitherto existing level of credit outstanding
until, if possible, a sustainable crisis solution is
found. Whether this kind of “voluntary PSI”
eventually implies significant costs for the
creditors, depends on the outcome of the crisis.
Thus the rollover itself is clearly a “soft” PSI as
interest payments on the renewed credit lines
continue at market rates. However, potential
costs for creditors lie in the risk of being caught
up in a deepening crisis with real losses. In a
number of crises, systems for monitoring
private external liabilities of domestic
financial institutions were introduced to ensure
adherence to rollover agreements. One broad
measure of success, which, however, could be
affected by a number of other factors, might be
whether rollover exercises contributed
significantly to bridging crisis-driven balance
of payments problems. A more direct measure
could be the rollover rate. This paper tries to
summarise the experience, in particular, with
rollover agreements, their monitoring, and the
respective roles of the creditor banks’ central
banks. The review focuses mainly on three
countries (South Korea, Brazil and Turkey) and
covers a wide range of features linked to a
rollover exercise. However, as each crisis had
its own idiosyncrasies and complexities, only
rough conclusions may be drawn from an
assessment and comparison of the country
cases.
2 REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCE
Rollovers of external liabilities of domestic
financial institutions were arranged during the
Asian crisis in 1997-98 in South Korea,
Thailand and Indonesia, during the Brazilian
crisis in 1999 and during the Turkish crisis in
2000/01. The debt to be rolled over was
guaranteed by the debtor governments.
Monitoring systems were introduced by the
debtor countries’ authorities in the context of
IMF-supported adjustment programmes and
with the assistance of IMF staff (“swat teams”),
as rollover of short-term foreign debt was seen
as critical for the viability of the programmes.
While coverage of the monitoring exercises
was mainly limited to interbank transaction of
domestic banks (incl. their offshore branches
and subsidiaries) vis-à-vis foreign banks,
foreign banks’ holdings of marketable
securities and non-bank liabilities were
captured, if at all, only roughly due to
statistical and legal impediments. The debtor
banks’ central banks collected daily or weekly
flow data and provided information on, in
particular, the rollover ratio and net change in
exposure. The IMF, after processing the
figures, disseminated this information via its
Executive Directors to the central banks of the
creditor countries. Aggregate figures were
supplied on a country-by-country basis to all
participating banks’ central banks. In addition,
data for individual banks registered in
particular countries were supplied to the
respective central banks of those countries.
Under the coordination of major central banks
(e.g. for Brazil: Federal Reserve; for Turkey:
Deutsche Bundesbank) regular conference
calls among the central banks of the debtor
countries’ larger creditor countries (the G10;
plus Spain and Portugal in the case of Brazil)
took place to investigate the plausibility of the
data obtained from different sources and to
survey actual developments in the light of the
rollover agreements, thereby exchanging
information collected on the basis of the central
banks’ contacts with creditor banks. Debtor
* Prepared by Stephan von Stenglin.44
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country representatives who were more or less
involved in the management of the debt
monitoring system participated in the calls in
the cases of Brazil and Turkey but not in the
cases of South Korea and Indonesia.
With the exception of South Korea (where an
agreement was reached with the G10 under
which the monetary authorities would seek to
persuade their creditor banks to stick to the
rollover agreement) any moral suasion of
creditor banks was at the sole discretion of the
responsible central bank. Central banks had
contacted their relevant commercial banks and
had an exchange of views and information, but
only a few of the central banks were ready to
exert outright moral suasion. One argument in
favour of moral suasion is that exerting it in
order to maintain exposures might help
preserve the financial positions of creditor
banks, without which a run on the external
liabilities of a country’s domestic banks could
lead to a default on creditor banks’ claims.
Merely contacting creditor banks was seen as a
very mild form of moral suasion that might
have a positive effect on the rolling over of
exposures. An argument against moral suasion
is that the onus for securing PSI should rest
with the debtor country, and that potential
conflicts of interest could arise, since
creditors’ central banks, in addition to seeking
to promote the safety and stability of the
international financial system, also have a
responsibility to safeguard the health of the
financial institutions within their jurisdiction.
In addition, encouraging creditor banks to
maintain their exposures will not solve a debtor
country’s key financial problem if that problem
is an excessive debt of the public sector and not
the external interbank obligations of the banks.
The following brief account of individual
rollover cases shows that the rollover exercises
and their results differed from country to country.
2.1 SOUTH KOREA
After the approved SBA (combined with the
announced financial package) failed to turn
around negative market sentiment, major
central banks called meetings to convince their
respective commercial banks to roll over their
maturing interbank lines. The rollover was
arranged and announced relatively quickly, and
rollover rates rose significantly. After an
extension of the rollover arrangement expired,
a voluntary debt restructuring (maturity
extension between one and three years) was
signed. The spreads on the extended bonds
were well below those on the JP Morgan
EMBI+ index and indicated the revival of
market confidence.
Over many years, South Korea was regarded as
a country with a healthy economy – with
particularly high growth rates, a balanced
budget and a sound balance of payments.
Confidence was high and spreads in the
international financial markets were rather
low. The management of the financial crisis
was supported by the impression that the
difficulties would likely be only temporary. As
the rapid withdrawal of external credit to the
domestic banks was at the core of the financial
crisis in South Korea, it was readily apparent to
most participants that stopping the run-off was
key to preserving the solvency of these banks,
and hence preserving the value of creditor
claims. In addition, because there were few or
no other factors threatening to deepen the crisis
(e.g. hyperinflation or a default by the public
sector) even if the financial problems of the
domestic banks were addressed, this gave
further comfort to creditor country authorities
that a coordinated rollover agreement would
not put creditor claims at severe risk. In the
event, therefore, negotiations with a small
number of creditor banks on the rollover of
their exposure and the restructuring of the
South Korean debt proved to be well-targeted.
It was clear to all participants that the value of
any individual creditor’s claims depended on
the willingness of other creditors to roll over
their exposure. There was very close
cooperation; a series of meetings and road
shows were held and creditor banks felt well
informed. Due to a restrictive capital account
system the bulk of external liabilities had to be45
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channelled through domestic banks. This
facilitated the monitoring which was
strengthened by daily telephone conferences.
The close cooperation also was supported by
moral suasion.
2.2 BRAZIL
A monitoring system was put in place after IMF
Executive Directors and the BIS asked to be
informed on interbank debt rollovers in advance
of the December 1998 SBA approval and
provision of bilateral support for the Brazilian
adjustment effort. The rollover rates had been
particularly low in October 1998 as, in response
to news that Brazil had initiated policy
discussions with the IMF, private creditors
feared they might get caught up in a concerted
rollover. Later, however, a form of “voluntary
PSI” was secured when commercial bank
creditors agreed to maintain their interbank
credit lines with Brazilian banks. The names of
the participating creditors were published. The
agreement was presented both by the
participating banks and by the Brazilian
authorities as very successful. Capital inflows to
Brazil held up better than might have been
expected over the six month period in which the
agreement was in force, as shown by the fact that
the exchange rate and foreign reserves were
relatively stable in the face of a rapid reduction
in domestic interest rates and a continuing large
current account deficit. Total exposure even
increased slightly over the period.
The economic fundamentals were not quite as
favourable as in South Korea. Weaker growth
rates coincided with internal and external
deficits. In addition, Brazil’s spreads in the
international financial markets were
significantly higher than those of South Korea,
clearly reflecting lower confidence among
foreign investors. Nevertheless, Brazil
managed to overcome the financial crisis of
1998/99, and it may be said in retrospect that
the open and targeted way of managing
relations with foreign creditor banks was
certainly helpful. In particular, during the
monitoring of the rollover agreement, Brazil
had direct and close contacts with the banks
and disseminated a lot of detailed data to them.
It is very likely that the continuous flow of
information helped creditors to better
understand the debtor’s circumstances.
Moreover, the system of monitoring implied
that individual creditors were informed of the
actions and intentions of other creditors. Banks
were thus able to understand the reasons for
changes in the exposure, and the risk of a
concerted draw-down of assets vis-à-vis Brazil
may have been reduced. Besides, the close
contacts between Brazil and its creditor banks
and with the corresponding central banks in the
creditor countries also may have helped to
exert a mild form of moral suasion. In addition
to the efficient monitoring, Brazil’s reform
programme was convincing and was supported
by significant bilateral assistance from major
creditor countries.
2.3 TURKEY
During the monitoring period (December 2000
to December 2001) the cumulative outflow was
more than USD 8 billion, with creditor banks
reducing their exposure to Turkish financial
institutions by more than 40%. In the course of
the year, weekly net flows, despite fluctuations,
still produced a general downward trend. After a
major acceleration of outflows in the third
quarter, the pace of outflows stabilised and
slowed considerably in December. In January
and in the first half of February 2002 no further
cumulated net outflows took place. All in all, the
result of the rollover exercise was regarded as
unsatisfactory. Compared with the South
Korean and Brazilian cases, Turkey showed
differences with respect to the macroeconomic
situation (high public debt), official financing
(no bilateral assistance apart from the IMF), the
procedures to involve the private sector (no
moral suasion, mild monitoring, vague
commitment of international banks to
rollover)42and the authorities’ commitment to
42 Creditor banks and their respective central banks from G-10
countries complained about the lack of a level playing field as
smaller countries’ creditor banks were included neither in the
rollover agreements nor in the monitoring exercise.46
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the adjustment and reform process (politically
controversial). In addition, the rollover
agreement did not publicise the names of
participating banks. Finally, not only did
markets anticipate the strong official
commitment to Turkey due to the country’s geo-
strategic importance, but official financing
commitments were also made prior to each
rollover agreement.
2.4 OTHER CASES
In the case of Thailand, agreement to roll over a
significant part of maturing short-term debt
was achieved before approval of the SBA (the
bulk of total short-term debt was owed to
branches and subsidiaries of Japanese banks
resident in the country). Rollover rates
remained high until Japanese creditor banks
faced problems at home. The original SBA with
Indonesia, approved on 5 November 1997 did
not require a certain level of rollover. Only
with the deepening of the crisis, did external
debt monitoring, initially focused on interbank
lines, begin in March 1998. Later the
monitoring effort was complicated by
including debt owed by corporations (three-
fourths of private external debt). Due to
available rupiah liquidity and a liberalised
foreign exchange market, Indonesian banks
largely repaid their foreign interbank debt.
Thus, a significant net outflow took place
before a late agreement was reached in August
1998 to roll over the rest.
3 ASSESSMENT
The experience with these cases has been
mixed. The rollover exercises have been
successful inasmuch as in all cases the acute
crisis situation has been overcome. In
particular, the agreement between South Korea
and the foreign creditor banks and the
monitoring thereof were widely seen as having
been rather successful. Starting from the Asian
crisis, however, the effectiveness of rollover
and monitoring exercises seems to have
decreased over the years. In some cases the
monitored liabilities represented only a small
share of total external liabilities, and their
rollover may not have had any impact on the
crisis resolution. Moreover, despite low
rollover rates (high net outflow) the crises have
still been overcome. In general, the
significance of rollover exercises may be
waning as international bank loans are
increasingly replaced by the issuance of bonds.
3.1 WHICH FACTORS HAVE HAD A POSITIVE
IMPACT ON ROLLOVER EXERCISES?
The factors which have had the greatest
positive influence on the rollovers are a history
of high performance and healthy economic
fundamentals (South Korea), and commitment
by the authorities to the IMF programme
combined with credible adjustment efforts
(South Korea, Brazil). These factors, together
with bilateral assistance from major creditor
countries (Brazil) and an efficient crisis
management, including an open and targeted
way of managing relations with foreign
creditor banks (Korea, Brazil at a later stage),
have clearly helped to strengthen the
participating creditors’ confidence. There was
also a positive effect from having a restrictive
capital account system which meant that the
bulk of external liabilities had to be channelled
through domestic banks, thereby facilitating
creditor coordination and a more effective
monitoring (Korea). Moreover, creditor banks
cited the publication of the names of banks
participating in the rollover agreement as a
reason for their participation as it increased the
chance of securing a level playing field
(Brazil).
3.2 WHICH FACTORS HAVE HAD A NEGATIVE
IMPACT ON ROLLOVER EXERCISES?
One major reason why some rollovers have not
succeeded in providing an adequate temporary
breathing space to avoid a bank run is that
creditors may not have been convinced that the
debtor country’s financial situation was going
to stabilise and recover (Turkey). Another
important negative factor was that large net47
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outflows took place before a rollover or a
monitoring was agreed (late agreements in
Indonesia, Brazil). Moreover, weak rollovers
have been partly “demand-driven”. Debtor
banks may not have been willing to pay the high
spreads required by the market. Credit demand
was bound to diminish anyway owing to weak
economic conditions in the debtor country
(Turkey, Brazil). Creditors’ behaviour may
also have been affected by bad news from other
emerging markets (contagion in South Korea,
Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey).
In general, creditor banks had limited
incentives to stick to their rollover agreements
in cases where
– official financing commitments were made
prior to each rollover agreement (Turkey),
– relatively loose conditionality provided the
creditors some scope to renege on their
commitments, and the rollover agreement
did not publicise the names of participating
banks (Turkey),
– the provision of information to commercial
banks was insufficient to overcome the
creditor coordination problem and/or the
geographical distribution of creditor banks
was highly dispersed (Korea, Indonesia,
Brazil, Turkey),
– there was concern among individual creditor
banks about unequal treatment (e.g. no
inclusion of commercial papers or of smaller
countries’ creditor banks in the agreements)
and about what to do in the event of an
insufficient rollover (Brazil, Turkey), and
– there was no uniform view within the G10 on
whether and to what extent moral suasion
should be exercised (Brazil, Turkey).
3.3 WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM
THE ROLLOVER EXPERIENCE?
First, to avoid large net outflows before a
rollover or a monitoring is agreed,  timely
action is needed. While the main responsibility
for organising a timely rollover lies with the
debtor country, IMF technical support seems to
be indispensable (e.g. capacity to collect,
process and communicate high quality data
with short lags and to respond promptly to
questions and identify emerging problems etc.;
the drafting of a standard agreement for use in
voluntary arrangements could be considered).
Second, the debtor country’s commitment to an
accompanying IMF adjustment programme
must be clear to boost its credibility in the
markets. IMF programmes themselves should
be more systematic on monitoring rollovers
and on the consistency between their
assumptions about private financing and
medium-term debt sustainability (financing
assurances). In order to strengthen a credible
and predictable implementation of PSI by the
public sector, IMF programmes might clearly
state the possible consequences of a failure to
rollover, such as:
– the requirement of additional domestic
adjustment or
– a reduction in IMF financing and/or
– a standstill of payments.
Third, depending on their share of overall
external liabilities, concentrating on short-
term interbank liabilities facilitates an
efficient rollover monitoring. It is important to
be aware, however, that private sector outflow
elsewhere on the capital account tends to be
ignored. In general, the importance of rollover
exercises may be waning due to increased
securitisation.
Fourth, despite some inconsistencies (e.g.
relating to different reference dates, creditor
and debtor definitions, allocation of syndicated
loans), statistical data from different sources
turned out to be broadly comparable with each
other. To avoid monitoring an agreement based
on inappropriate definitions, it might be better
to rely on the consolidated exposure figures of48
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larger lending institutions, rather than on
debtor-reported statistics.
Fifth, with regard to the role of creditor banks’
central banks and moral suasion, there was
little evidence from the monitoring calls that
the involvement of any central bank (except in
the case of South Korea) had modified in any
significant way the behaviour of the creditor
banks. Nevertheless, the banks have often
expressed their fear of being caught up in a
rollover exercise. It may not be sufficient for a
successful rollover, however, to have a
mandate only to monitor the data. Creditor
banks’ central banks must be prepared to
approach domestic and foreign banks with
questions, recognising the sensitivity of the
markets. Some degree of moral suasion may be
useful. Moreover, in exceptional cases,
particularly those involving systemic risk,
moral suasion on the part of the official
community in support of a rollover agreement
between the debtor country and its bank
creditors may be warranted. On the other hand,
creditor country central banks may prefer to
take a more hands-off approach and decide
against direct measures whenever public sector
pressure on private creditors to accept defaults
on their claims is regarded as being
incompatible with a market-based system.
Sixth, creditor banks should be provided with
strong incentives to stick to their
commitments, for instance by concluding
official support packages only after a rollover
agreement has been finalised, by drawing the
agreement as widely as possible (even if the
monitoring would become more complicated),
by introducing interest caps on debt to be rolled
over cautiously and in a market-sensitive way,
by establishing a strategy to “guarantee” equal
treatment in the event of an insufficient
rollover, and by making the participants in the
agreement public.49
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1 DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND ELEMENTS
OF A MORE PREDICTABLE FRAMEWORK
FOR THE USE OF STANDSTILLS
The resolution of sovereign debt crises may
entail, and has occasionally entailed, a
temporary interruption of debt service
payments by the debtor country. Three
different types of arrangement are
acknowledged in the legal literature. A
standstill is an agreement (formal or informal)
between a debtor and one or more of its
creditors providing for a temporary suspension
of debt-service payments by the borrower and
of legal actions by creditors. The term
moratorium is used to describe unilateral
actions (formal or informal) by the debtor to
suspend its debt-service payments without the
agreement of its creditors. Finally, a stay is a
suspension of creditor rights triggered by a
formal declaration of default legally enforced
by a third party – an example is the notion of
“automatic stay” under Chapter 11 of US
bankruptcy law. In this paper, the term
“standstill” is used to indicate a temporary
suspension of payments by the debtor that is
ultimately accepted by creditors. This may
happen either explicitly or tacitly, in a
voluntary or quasi-coerced fashion, and
possibly after the debtor has unilaterally
declared a moratorium. In the remainder of the
present section we shall examine the rationale
of standstills so defined, and discuss the
conflict between debtor and creditors that may
arise with the suspension of debt-related
payments. The discussion is aimed at sketching
out a model (or elements of such a model) that
may help to deepen our understanding of the
varying degrees of debtor-creditor
confrontation within a standstill and of the
boundary between standstills and moratoria.
Actual experience with these arrangements is
discussed in the second section.
The economic rationale for a temporary
suspension of creditor rights was clarified in
the early 1980s by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and Gorton (1985), with special reference to
bank runs and thus in a domestic and non-
sovereign setting.43 In particular, in “opaque”
crises where there is great uncertainty, it may
be socially efficient to provide for a “circuit-
breaker” that allows some “breathing space”,
i.e. a more pondered assessment of the
circumstances and more time to organise an
appropriate policy response. Moreover, as
shown by Wallace (1988), a suspension policy
may be preferable to a lender of last resort
policy, unless the authorities have superior
information as to the nature and extent of the
crisis.
Although standstills may at times be necessary,
they nonetheless represent a drastic tool for
crisis management, and constitute a breach of
contract that should normally be avoided,
especially in an international context. The most
controversial aspects of standstills in a
sovereign setting include (a) their relation to
debt restructuring arrangements and (b) their
impact on debtor-creditor relations. Standstills
do not coincide with restructuring agreements,
which involve a change in the payment terms of
the original debt instruments, but they may
well pave the way for a subsequent
restructuring. Furthermore, as noted in IMF
(1996), standstill and restructuring agreements
“raise the same legal issues with respect to
their negotiation, conclusion and enforcement,
as well as the risks posed by free-rider
creditors. Indeed, even conceding that
standstills are aimed at “buying time” in
situations where there is uncertainty about
whether the crisis is one of illiquidity or one of
insolvency, debt restructuring would be,
admittedly, unavoidable if the crisis turned out
to be one of insolvency. In this latter case, an
appropriate framework of rules and practices
*    Prepared by Marco Committeri.
43 Suspensions of deposit convertibility in the nineteenth
century, “bank holidays” in the 1930s, and special
administration procedures in the bank solvency regimes of
many countries today, are all examples of standstills in action
at the domestic level.50
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would have to be in place to ensure orderly
negotiations to bring the debt down to more
sustainable levels. Thus, standstills can be
considered as an instrument of crisis
management only in association with a
backstop solution for debt restructuring (a
statutory SDRM, a contractual approach based
on CACs, a voluntary code of conduct for debt
negotiations).44
As to the impact on debtor-creditor relations,
this is likely to be determined endogenously on
the basis of the general environment in which
negotiations for debt restructuring can take
place. The relevant features of this
environment pertain to the extent to which (a)
creditors’ collective action problems can be
solved, (b) debtor abuse can be avoided, and (c)
the IMF can play an effective role in attaining
the two former objectives. These features
affect the incentives faced by the parties
involved, and thus have a bearing on whether
payment suspensions would be “a part of a
process of cooperative and non-confrontational
debt re-negotiation” or of “a more adversarial
nature” (Group of Ten, 1996, p. 21).
The severity of collective action problems is
closely related to the complexity of a country’s
external debt,45 the characteristics of its
investor base,46 and the unavailability of means
to achieve effective coordination between such
creditors.47 In principle, CACs could provide a
convenient means for the negotiation of a
standstill.48 However, none of the recent bond
issues made under the New York jurisdiction
included engagement provisions for creditor
coordination beyond the majority restructuring
and enforcement provisions (Drage and
Hovaguimian, 2004). Thus, further progress
would be needed in the area of bondholder
representation before CACs represent an
effective instrument for ensuring orderly
standstills.
Discussions in policy circles have also
highlighted the fact that the behaviour of
debtors will be important for creditors’
reactions. In this context the following
44 These considerations are reinforced by the expectation that a
more systematic use of debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) in
standard IMF surveillance (and their greater integration with
balance sheet analyses, BSAs) may help to make crises more
“transparent” at their very outset. Although these exercises
remain eminently probabilistic in nature, and it will be always
difficult to draw a neat line between illiquidity and
insolvency, the case for expeditious and orderly restructuring
negotiations will be reinforced when downside risks are
dominant and reasonable suspicions of insolvency remain.
45 In terms of instruments (bonds, loans, trade credits) and the
related payment schedule.
46 I.e. the categories of creditor involved, the number and
homogeneity of creditors within each category, and the
relative weight of creditors with an interest in maintaining
long-term business relations with the borrowing country.
Collective action problems have increased in the last decade,
as a result of the shift in the composition of sovereign debt
towards traded, internationally held, securitised instruments.
47 Another factor is the ability (or willingness) of national
authorities in creditor countries to exert moral suasion on the
relevant lenders and investors. See Annex 3.
48 As noted in IMF (1996), under the trust deed a bondholders’
meeting could be called by the debtor for the purpose of
considering resolutions related to, among other things, an
amendment of the dates of payment of interest (i.e., a
standstill of limited duration, during which good faith
negotiations could be conducted).
49 If debt service payment interruptions are perceived as
stemming from an unwillingness to pay or from policy
mistakes that stand uncorrected, they are likely to be opposed
by creditors. The ensuing moratoria may result in more
complex and confrontational restructuring negotiations;
aggressive litigation could effectively prevent balance of
payments adjustment and thus derail the programme
predicated under the IMF lending-into-arrears policy (see
below).
50 In particular, individual creditors (foreign and domestic)
within a class of instruments should be treated the same and
holders of different instruments should in general be treated
according to the seniority of their contracts. The burden of
proof, in the event of a departure from this presumption,
should rest with the debtor country. As discussed in the paper
by Cassou, de Lis and Weber, “Involvement of Domestic
Creditors in Crisis Resolution” (see Annex 5), the case may be
made for a different treatment of domestic banks.
elements will be relevant to ensure that
standstills are not abused by the debtor
(neutrality). First, the debtor should
demonstrate good faith during the standstill.49
Second, the debtor should release all pertinent
information to all creditors in a timely fashion
(transparency). Third, the standstill should be
set within a timeframe specifying the date of its
removal as well as the interim steps deemed
necessary to restore normal conditions (limited
duration). Fourth, creditors should be treated
equally as far as possible (equal treatment).50
Fifth, the standstill on some classes of assets
should not be used to facilitate a generalised51
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capital flight from the country concerned
(capital and exchange controls).51 While the
first principle had long represented the main
pillar of the IMF’s policy of “lending into
arrears” (see below), it is only recently that
good faith, transparency and equal treatment
have been acknowledged as an integral part of a
voluntary “code of conduct” for the
restructuring negotiations of sovereign bonds.
It is interesting that in the most recent draft of
the code (IIF et al., 2004) the possibility has
been contemplated for debtor countries to
establish or reinforce, on a temporary and
exceptional basis, exchange controls on capital
outflows. More importantly, voluntary
standstills have been implicitly recognised, in
the form of temporary rollovers of short-term
maturities on public and private sector
obligations, as a means to substantiate
creditors’ cooperative support for adjustment
efforts by the debtor.
At the current juncture, the IMF can only affect
the incentives for an orderly standstill in an
informal and non-statutory fashion, through
statements of opinion and the conditionality
attached to its financial arrangements.52 The
IMF policy on lending into arrears (LIA) is
likely to act at three distinct levels. First,
unlike banks, countries need interim liquidity
during a standstill. By providing foreign money
to finance a budget or current account deficit
throughout the standstill, the IMF acquires, at
least in theory, greater leverage on the
sovereign debtor. This may strengthen the
credibility of the country’s adjustment effort,
and reinforce creditor perceptions that the
country is genuinely unable (not unwilling) to
pay. Second, LIA is generally provided on the
understanding that the country will be
negotiating in good faith with its creditors,
which is one of the necessary conditions
(although not a sufficient one) for obtaining
creditors’ forbearance. Third, the LIA policy is
naturally linked, as any other IMF lending, to
the new exceptional access framework for
capital account crises.53 The possibility of
withholding financial assistance from
countries whose debt is unsustainable, if
perceived as credible by foreign creditors,
would strengthen the threat of sovereign
default needed to persuade them to approve the
standstill. Furthermore, it would create an
incentive for debtor countries not to wait until
the problems get more acute, and to reach an
agreement with their creditors at the outset of
the crisis.54 Overall, given practical difficulties
in determining what constitutes “good faith”
behaviour in sovereign debt restructuring
negotiations, credible limits to IMF financing
51 In this context, capital and exchange controls represent an
ancillary instrument to cope with capital flight that may be
triggered by a decision to suspend debt service payments
(whether taken on a unilateral or consensual basis). They are
aimed at reassuring the creditors that all efforts are being
made to prevent a depletion of national resources and maintain
the country’s ability to repay in the future. Capital flight
would be more likely in cases in which the authorities had not
yet elaborated, or not yet started implementing, a
comprehensive adjustment strategy in the early phase of the
standstill. Broad-based capital outflows would also be likely
to be triggered by a default on domestic sovereign obligations,
particularly if the default were seen as compromising
domestic banks’ ability to manage their liquidity, or as
presaging the introduction of comprehensive exchange
controls.
52 The idea of a more formalised IMF involvement, through a
change in the interpretation of Art. VIII.2(b) of the IMF
Articles of Agreement or the amendment of its language, was
discussed in IMF (1996) and IMF (2000c) and in the context of
the SDRM debate. Art. VIII.2(b) states that “exchange
contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that
member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member”. If the expression “exchange contracts” were
interpreted as encompassing credit agreements, claims
arising from sovereign default would be made temporarily
unenforceable following a decision by the Board. In any event,
the article in question provides only limited protection from
creditor litigation. For effective protection an amendment of
the IMF Articles of Agreement would be required, which the
membership may not be prepared to support.
53 This framework is built on the idea that IMF lending above
normal limits should be provided only to countries that (a) are
able to comply with the conditionality attached to the
programme, (b) have a debt burden which appears sustainable
under unfavourable circumstances, and (c) have reasonable
prospects of regaining market access.
54 As an alternative means to solve this problem, the IMF has
recently started to make it a condition of LIA that the country
reach an established target for foreign exchange reserves –
which means that some debts vis-à-vis private creditors would
not be honoured as scheduled. However, this strategy was
largely ineffective (see Eichengreen and Ruehl, 2000).52
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appear to be the most important element of a
system of incentives for orderly standstills – all
the more so if coupled with strong
conditionality and in the context of non-
statutory frameworks.55 However, while limits
on access to IMF resources could affect debtor-
creditor expectations and a debtor’s decision to
pursue a pre-emptive restructuring, it is not
obvious that access limits could in themselves
have a measurable impact on the restructuring
process once standstills are imposed. Besides,
the IMF’s new access policy has been approved
only recently, and it will take time for its
rigorous implementation to influence the
behaviour of sovereign debtors and private
creditors.
2 REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF PAST
EXPERIENCE
The above considerations remain rather
speculative at this stage, since no or very little
experience has been gained so far with the
elements discussed above (CACs, code of
conduct, and the exceptional access policy).
As to the experience of standstills and
moratoria, differences have clearly emerged in
the experience related to different categories of
creditors. Regarding sovereign and
commercial bank creditors, numerous
“voluntary” standstills have regularly been
arranged under two informal restructuring
mechanisms (the Paris Club and the London
Club, respectively). In both fora, standstills
were typically agreed (and have continued to be
agreed) on an informal, “de facto” basis, and in
the context of an adjustment programme also
supported by the IMF.
As regards the Paris Club, it has generally been
understood that during the renegotiation period
sovereign creditors would not press their
claims by instituting a legal process against a
sovereign borrower (claims may be pressed in
other ways, including by diplomatic means, by
reducing or freezing bilateral assistance, or by
imposing economic sanctions, and loans may
be assigned to a third party, who might then
take legal action). In turn, the borrower would
undertake to provide comparable treatment to
non-Paris Club creditors. In the case of the
London Club,56 unilateral moratoria imposed
by the debtor have generally been followed by
an acquiescence of the commercial banks in
those instances where the debtor could
demonstrate a good faith intention to negotiate.
This approach has resulted in de facto
standstills similar to those of the Paris Club
until the completion of the restructuring
agreement.57 The two Clubs have provided
reasonably effective fora for standstill
negotiations with other sovereign and private
bank creditors. Even before their creation
(Paris Club 1956 and London Club 1976), the
relatively limited number of creditors made it
55 In the paper by Haldane and Krueger (2001), firm limits to
official financing were considered an essential prerequisite
for establishing a more predictable framework for standstills,
and no formal “sanctioning role” was envisaged for the IMF.
See also Giannini (2002).
56 London Club procedures initially covered only the
rescheduling of medium and long-term bank debt, but have
since allowed the restructuring of other forms of debt to
commercial banks, as well as the reduction of claims using the
techniques established under the Brady initiative.
57 Banks participating in the London Club are represented by a
“steering committee” or “advisory committee”, typically
consisting of no more than 10-20 banks, which deals directly
with the sovereign borrower. The negotiations between the
sovereign debtor and the steering committee are completed
when agreement is reached on a term sheet outlining the
proposed restructuring terms. Syndicated loan agreements
usually require the unanimous consent of creditor banks; in
some cases, banks dissatisfied with the terms being offered
assigned their claims to other parties, and actions were
brought against the sovereign debtor. London Club
reschedulings tend to be longer and more costly than Paris
Club negotiations, because of the greater number of
participants and the different mechanism for implementing
the agreement (while the Paris Club negotiates a framework
for rescheduling – the Agreed Minutes – that is then legally
implemented through a series of bilateral agreements, the
London Club negotiates one comprehensive agreement that is
legally binding once formulated). Another difference between
the two clubs is that while the Paris Club usually requires the
debtor to be in a position of “imminent default” and to have
and agreement with the IMF in place before undertaking the
negotiations, the London Club is far more likely to engage in
“pre-emptive” rescheduling and to restructure debt service
payments in the absence of an IMF arrangement (see
Biersteker, 1993).53
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possible to negotiate standstills among the
majority of such creditors.
On the other hand, cases of payment
suspensions with private-sector bondholders
have tended to be rather exceptional, and no
fora or procedures similar to those of the Paris
and London Clubs have been established. In the
1970s and 1980s, debt service on sovereign
bonds was not generally interrupted at times of
crisis, nor were such bonds restructured as part
of the resolution of crises, mainly reflecting the
perception that attempting such restructuring
would have been extremely difficult. Only a
few bond restructurings were actually
accomplished during the debt crises of the
1980s (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and
Nigeria; see Fernandez-Ansola and Laursen,
1995). Unlike the experience in the 1930s, no
official bondholder committees were involved
in the settlements. Instead debtor countries
made unilateral bond exchange offers
formulated on the basis of informal contacts
with the main group of creditors. These cases
were all settled relatively quickly (in less than
one year) compared to the historical experience
of bond defaults in the 1930s.58 However, the
amounts of debt involved were not substantial,
since bonded debt was a relatively small share
of the total at that time.
Among the crisis episodes observed after
Mexico (1994-95), only Ecuador (1999-2000),
Russia (1998-2000) and Argentina (2001-
present) have taken the form of a unilateral
moratorium.59 In the case of Ecuador (the first
ever default on a Brady bond), the investor base
was mainly represented by institutional
investors in New York and London, specialised
in emerging markets. The authorities made
only limited attempts to contact the creditors,
and resisted the establishment of investor
committees. An exchange offer was launched
only after the country had been in default for
almost a year and following the approval of a
new SBA. The IMF was actually involved in
the meeting with creditors. In the case of
Russia, the moratorium was imposed while the
country was still able to honour its debt
obligations. Russia refrained from consulting
the holders of these debt securities, both at the
outset and during most of the moratorium, and
the IMF was not consulted either before or
during most of the moratorium.60 Unlike the
two latter cases (where litigation was on the
whole rather limited), Argentina’s moratorium
has been plagued by harsh debtor-creditor
confrontations. This was made more acute by
the new IMF arrangement approved in
September 2003. The arrangement entailed a
three-year rollover of IMF credit to exceptional
levels in the context of a rather weak
conditionality, and was perceived by the
58 In the case of Panama, the formulation of an acceptable
settlement was complicated by the diverse group of creditors
involved. In the cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala, it took
from 6 to 12 months to complete a bond restructuring, with 90
to 100% of bondholders accepting the offer. This reflected the
fact that these agreements involved the rollover of maturing
bonds, more favourable terms on the new instruments, and a
partial up-front payment of interest arrears (Costa Rica). The
restructuring of bonds defaulted by Nigeria and Panama was
also worked out in less than one year with the participation of
virtually all bondholders, but only after these bonds had been
in default for extended periods.
59 The cases of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia (1997-1998),
Brazil (1999) and Turkey (2000-2001) all involved rollovers
of external liabilities of domestic financial institutions (see
annex 3).
60 In the case of Russia, the moratorium was accompanied by
capital controls.54
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parties involved as altering their bargaining
power.61
In the remaining crises (Pakistan 1998-1999,
Ukraine 1999-2000 and Uruguay 2002-2003),
an exchange offer was launched while the
debtor country was still current on its
payments, and the offer was accepted before a
default could occur (thus in a de facto
interruption of debt-related payments). The
settlement was implemented and maintained in
consultation with creditors, while being
supported by the IMF in the context of
discussions on an adjustment programme. In
the cases of Pakistan and Ukraine, the narrow
investor base facilitated informal discussions
with creditors and ensured a relatively quick
and smooth restructuring of the debt. In the
case of Uruguay, where the investor base was
more diffuse, exit consents were also used to
make the old bonds less attractive through
modification of non-payment provisions, and
reduce the leverage of holdout creditors; the
offer was explicitly supported by the IMF as a
precondition to bring the country’s debt to
more sustainable levels.
Overall, these experiences appear to be rather
mixed. On one hand, all cases of standstill have
been non-consensual (i.e. imposed by the
debtor), have tended to be more confrontational
than those in which the exchange offer was
launched in a pre-default situation, and have
been associated with greater difficulties in the
process of debt restructuring. On the other
hand, in the case of standstills where a
restructuring agreement was reached with the
creditors, this allowed a more comprehensive
treatment that brought the debt to more
sustainable levels. In addition, the agreements
that did not entail any suspensions of debt
service payments were reached under
particularly favourable circumstances,
including a relatively narrow investor base, and
it is unclear whether they should represent the
only model for the resolution of future crises.
With the benefit of hindsight, one may wonder
whether, if the new exceptional access
61 The authorities announced the intention to restructure
domestic and foreign debt in late October 2001 under a two-
phase approach. Debt restructured in Phase 1 included all U.S.
dollar and Argentine peso bonds; bonds denominated in
European currencies and yen were not eligible. The first phase
was completed in December 2001.64 Phase 2 was to be
initiated within a few months of phase 1, but due to
deteriorating market conditions a moratorium on debt not
included in Phase 1 was announced in late December 2001.
When declaring the moratorium, the authorities specified that
discussions with creditors would have soon begun to
restructure the debt; the intention was reiterated in March
2002 (without the indication of any precise starting date), and
in February 2003, following the approval of a “transitional”
IMF arrangement in January. On the latter occasion, two
financial and legal advisors were appointed to assist in
designing the debt restructuring and in managing relations
with private creditors. Meetings with some creditor groups
actually begun in March 2003. In July 2003 the Argentine
Finance Secretary Nielsen pointed to the need to achieve a new
arrangement with the IMF “before announcing any [debt
restructuring] proposal, especially considering that Argentina
will have to discuss with this multilateral organisation its
medium term macroeconomic projections from where the
Republic’s payment capacity could be inferred”. Sovereign
debt restructuring guidelines were unveiled for the first time
on the periphery of the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings
in Dubai (September 2003), in the aftermath of a new three-
year SBA by the IMF. The first two reviews of the programme
were approved by the IMF Board in the context of increased
confrontation with private creditors. The third review was
unilaterally suspended by the authorities, after a second debt
restructuring proposal advanced in June 2004 was vocally
rejected by some major creditor committees. On 14 January
2005, three years after defaulting, Argentina launched a final
debt exchange offer without reaching a previous agreement
with its creditors. The offer involved the exchange of
defaulted bonds for three new types of securities, including a
par, discount, and quasi-par bond. To reinforce the authorities’
position that the offer was final, Argentina introduced new
legislation to preclude the government from re-opening the
debt exchange. The offer closed on 25 February 2005.
According to the authorities the participation rate was 76
percent (as against a participation in the range of 93-99
percent in previous sovereign bond restructurings), which
implied that about USD 62.3 billion out of USD 81.8 billion in
eligible claims was actually tendered in the debt exchange.
The observed acceptance rate was principally imputable to
Argentine creditors: while the participation of bonds held in
Argentina was in the order of 95-98 percent, that of bonds held
abroad was in the order of 66-70 percent. The country’s
remaining arrears currently amount to almost USD 20 billion
in principal and about USD 5 billion in past due interest.
framework had already been in place at the time
they were enforced, these standstills would
have been less confrontational. The September
2003 arrangement for Argentina is particularly
interesting in this regard, since it was approved
after the adoption of the new access policy and
in striking contrast with one of its pillars – the
debt sustainability criterion. If it is accepted,
on one hand, that the arrangement was mainly55
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granted as an “exception” for a country that had
already benefited from IMF credit under the old
access rules, it cannot be denied, on the other
hand, that the conditionality attached to the
arrangement was rather weak, and there was no
discernible strategy for reducing the IMF’s
exposure vis-à-vis the country. These factors
were perceived by the parties involved as
altering their respective bargaining power, and
helped to exacerbate the debtor-creditor
confrontation. One may also wonder whether,
if such standstills been limited to the principal
while interest continued to be paid, this would
have helped to avoid a rush of creditors to the
courts and facilitated the negotiation of a bond
exchange providing sufficient cash-flow relief
to ensure future sustainability.56
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INVOLVEMENT OF DOMESTIC CREDITORS IN
CRISIS RESOLUTION*
1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Partly as a result of an increase in the share of
sovereign debt held by residents in emerging
markets, some recent crises have featured an
extensive involvement of domestic creditors in
the resolution strategy. While Domestic
Private Sector Involvement (DPSI) can be
viewed as a component of the broader concept
of PSI, it has certain features that deserve a
special attention. Assessing the involvement of
domestic creditors in crisis resolution raises
issues of definition, measurement and
jurisdiction.
DPSI is an elusive concept. Broadly speaking,
PSI refers to efforts undertaken by
international private creditors to cover a
country’s external financing gap in the context
of a crisis resolution strategy. By analogy,
DPSI would refer to efforts undertaken by the
domestic private sector in a similar context.
The ambiguity of the term lies in the fact that
the mechanisms through which the
involvement of residents can contribute to
closing a country’s external financing gap are
not straightforward. However, a closer look
suggests a much tighter connection between
DPSI and a country’s actual or future balance
of payments position, and the actual or
potential external financing gap. First, capital
flight by residents has been an important factor
in capital account crises (although evidence in
this regard is subject to data uncertainties). On
occasions, the authorities have responded with
the introduction of controls on capital outflows
which can be considered a modality of DPSI to
the extent that they affect residents. However,
this annex devotes only limited attention to
capital controls since they are dealt with in
another part of the report. Second, in countries
with high informal dollarisation, changes in
domestic creditors’ confidence have a
considerable impact on national and sectoral
balance sheet imbalances. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, currency substitution by
residents to preserve wealth (“flight to
quality”) in a context of loss of confidence
directly impacts foreign exchange reserves,
and thus the capacity of the central bank to
sustain the peg. Under a flexible exchange rate
regime, unstable market dynamics generated in
the domestic sector may result in wide
fluctuations in the exchange rate, and, in the
context of external debt vulnerabilities, trigger
a capital account crisis.
Assessing DPSI in practice is a difficult task.
Indeed, authorities faced with an external
financial crisis typically resort to a whole set of
measures that, either simultaneously or
sequentially, entail some elements of bailing-
out and bailing-in of domestic creditors. As a
consequence, while gauging nominal and real
losses incurred by key domestic agents is
feasible, it is more difficult to gauge the overall
net effect (bailing in or bailing out) of measures
taken by national authorities and directed at
domestic creditors, not least because the
conclusions may vary depending on the time
horizon considered.
A salient feature of DPSI is its jurisdictional
dimension. First, since domestic creditors are
by definition subject to domestic legal and
regulatory frameworks designed and
implemented by the sovereign, they are directly
exposed to regulatory changes aimed at
involving them in the resolution of the crisis
(e.g. via forced placement of domestic debt,
changes in taxes, bank holidays and deposit
freezes) as well as to moral suasion by the
authorities. Second, claims of domestic
creditors on the public sector tend to be subject
to domestic law, even if denominated in foreign
currency. By contrast, liabilities vis-à-vis non-
residents tend to be governed by foreign law.
While this distinction does not hold in all crisis
episodes62 and tends to get blurred as the
* Prepared by Javier Díaz Cassou, Santiago Férnandez de Lis
and Pierre-François Weber.
62 In Russia, for instance, non-residents held one third of T-Bills
issued under domestic law.57
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opening of the capital account enables
residents to hold debt issued under foreign law
and foreign investors to buy claims issued
domestically, a sovereign typically has a
greater ability and a broader array of tools to
bail in the domestic private sector than foreign
creditors. This leverage becomes evident in
debt crises, where the sovereign can resort to
selective measures (e.g. domestic debt
exchanges and unilateral modifications of
domestic debt contracts) in a “gambling for
redemption” strategy.
This annex draws mainly on recent experience,
and in particular on four cases: Argentina,
Ecuador, Russia and Turkey (see Table 4). It
first analyses relations between DPSI and
domestic adjustment (point 2). It then assesses
interactions and sequencing between DPSI and
PSI (point 3). It concludes by highlighting
some tentative policy implications.
2 DPSI AND THE OVERALL ADJUSTMENT
PROCESS
DPSI and domestic adjustment are difficult to
disentangle in the context of a crisis resolution
strategy, as in both cases the burden is
ultimately borne by residents. This section
covers the linkages between DPSI and the
soundness of the domestic banking system and
analyses the ultimate burden sharing of DPSI
among the various segments of the domestic
private sector.
DPSI AND THE DOMESTIC BANKING SYSTEM
Recent experiences suggest that certain DPSI
measures can have a large impact on the
solvency of domestic banks, thereby adding to
the effects of the financial crisis and posing the
risk of precipitating the virtual collapse of the
banking system. On the asset side, domestic
banks are affected by DPSI to the extent that
they hold restructured assets. On the liability
side, the implementation of DPSI measures
may lead to a sudden loss of confidence,
triggering deposit withdrawals and the
interruption of interbank credit lines,
especially if domestic banks are highly
exposed to the sovereign in the context of
public debt servicing problems (Argentina,
Russia). Among the most directly damaging
DPSI measures for domestic banks are the
unilateral rescheduling or restructuring of
domestic public debt (Argentina, Ecuador,
Russia) or the asymmetric conversion to
domestic currency of banks’ assets and
liabilities in the context of highly dollarised
economies (asymmetric “pesification” in
Argentina).
Under adverse conditions or misguided
measures by authorities, the dynamics of
balance sheet vulnerabilities can rapidly result
in a liquidity shortage. This may force the
authorities to introduce other types of DPSI
measure affecting the non-banking sector in
order to keep the banking system afloat, while
in some instances extending liquidity
assistance at the same time. Such DPSI
measures include deposit freezes (Argentina,
Ecuador, Russia) or limits on deposit
withdrawals (“corralito” in Argentina).
Although the net effect of these kinds of
measure on the banking system and financial
infrastructure is difficult to assess, they may
ultimately result in a collapse of the payment
system, in the paralysis of the day-to-day
activities of banks and in spillovers to the rest
of the economy. Problems in the banking sector
often lead to a certain degree of regulatory
forbearance by the supervisory authority until
the banks’ solvency is restored, which
facilitates a gradual absorption of the costs of
the crisis.
These interactions between DPSI measures and
bank fragility impose a trade-off on policy-
makers in the setting of a crisis resolution
strategy. On one hand, banks play a crucial role
in the economy, and preserving a functioning
banking system is viewed as key to swift crisis
resolution. On the other hand, domestic banks
are typically important holders of government
securities in emerging markets (a common
feature of all four cases examined here) and can
therefore be used as a “penultimate resort” to
avoid a fully fledged default in cases where58
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public debt dynamics turn out to be
unsustainable.
Admittedly, the reaction of policy-makers to
this trade-off is contingent upon the specific
circumstances of each country. Still, two
scenarios seem to emerge, depending on
whether the banking system is weak at the
outset of the crisis, or whether problems in the
banking system are a result of the crisis. When
the banking sector is weak at the outset of the
crisis, as was the case in Ecuador, Turkey, and
Russia, the objective of keeping the banking
system afloat is an immediate priority. In such
cases, policy-makers tend to try to preserve the
operating capacity of financial institutions.
DPSI measures with regard to the financial
sector seem futile from the outset of the crisis
as the government is already faced with the
prospect of injecting funds into the banking
system in order to keep it afloat. Conversely,
when the banking sector is sound in the early
stages of the crisis, as was the case in
Argentina, policy makers seem to be more
tempted to resort to DPSI, despite the impact
these measures might have on the soundness of
the domestic banking system.63 In this sense,
the ex ante soundness of domestic banks may
constitute an incentive for policy-makers to
carry out DPSI. As illustrated by the
Argentinean experience, this second scenario
entails obvious risks. Imposing DPSI measures
on domestic banks may turn a sound banking
system into an insolvent one, thus exacerbating
the recession, hampering the recovery and
eventually leading to a social collapse.
Additionally, such DPSI measures spread the
cost of the crisis from the banking system to
various segments of the domestic sector, a
point discussed below.
THE ULTIMATE BURDEN SHARING OF DPSI
Like domestic adjustment, DPSI weighs on
various segments of the domestic private
sector, i.e. bank shareholders, taxpayers,
depositors, households, contributors to the
pension system etc. which often overlap. The
ultimate burden sharing of DPSI measures
mostly depends on political or administrative
decisions taken in the context of a crisis
resolution strategy.
The measures adopted concerning the domestic
banking system have in recent cases proved to
be critical in the ultimate allocation of the costs
of the crisis. First of all is the decision on how
much cost will be borne by the domestic
banking sector. This decision has a direct
impact on bank shareholders, whether
domestic or foreign. However, unless bank
shareholders decide (or are forced) to inject
fresh funds, their exposure is limited to their
capital. If losses exceed this capital, as is often
the case in systemic banking crises, other
sectors will have to share the cost of such
measures – either taxpayers (if ultimately the
government is forced to re-capitalise banks) or
depositors in the form of liquidity losses (if the
government imposes further DPSI measures
such as bank holidays or deposit freezes) or in
the form of capital losses (if such DPSI
measures ultimately lead to a fall in the real
value of deposits, or if there are bank closures
in the absence of total explicit or implicit
deposit insurance mechanisms).
A clear case is that of contributors to pension
funds in countries that have adopted a
capitalisation scheme (e.g. Argentina). In such
cases, pension funds may be explicitly or
implicitly forced to invest a significant part of
their portfolio in government securities as a
result of regulatory limitations on investment
abroad, in a context of few investment
alternatives other than public debt offered by
the domestic financial system. In that case, a
unilateral restructuring of domestic debt will
impose a loss on pension funds that is not
necessarily a result of risky investment
practices on the part of fund managers. This
cost will ultimately be borne by future and
present pensioners to an extent that is a result of
two administrative decisions: the ex ante
limitations on pension fund investment
63 As explained in the next point, in these cases the involvement
of the banking system may also be used to alleviate the impact
of the crisis on certain constituencies. Indeed, asymmetric
“pesification” was partially aimed at alleviating the impact of
the devaluation on households indebted in dollars.59
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practices, and the ex post DPSI imposed on
pension funds.
3 DOMESTIC PSI AND EXTERNAL PSI
As a result of the surge in financial FDI, the
nature of the operations of international banks
in emerging markets has tended to evolve from
cross-border lending to local activity through
branches and subsidiaries. In this context,
international banks may play the role both of
domestic creditors (through the operations of
their subsidiaries64 in the host country) and of
external creditors (through cross-border
lending) blurring the distinction between DPSI
and “external” PSI. This section sheds some
light on the interactions between DPSI and PSI.
Looking at DPSI and external PSI separately
may be misleading when a substantial part of
the domestic banking system is owned by
foreign institutions. International creditors
with local branches or subsidiaries tend to
manage country risk on a consolidated basis.
Exiting a host country under stress can prove
difficult and costly due to financial, legal and
reputational problems, but the parent company
usually has other means to reduce its exposure
to the country (for instance reducing its
holdings of the country’s external debt). In this
context, unless other conventional PSI
measures are effective at stabilising the cross-
border exposure of international banks to the
country concerned, the imposition of DPSI
measures on domestic banks, a significant part
of which are partly or fully owned by
international institutions, may ultimately
prove ineffective in its objective of alleviating
balance of payment pressures.
Additionally, the political economy of DPSI
can have a bearing on the scope for PSI. Recent
experience suggests that in situations of stress
the authorities of the host country may be
tempted to treat subsidiaries of foreign banks
and domestic banks differently in terms of
access to central bank liquidity or to other
government initiatives to restore the soundness
of the banking system. Anecdotal evidence
from Argentina and Russia points in this
direction. It has been claimed that on occasions
the Argentinean authorities were more
reluctant to provide foreign-owned domestic
banks with liquidity assistance. Russian
authorities granted regulatory forbearance to
168 “eligible” entities (by “freezing”
prudential requirements), while at the same
pressing foreign parent banks to recapitalise
their subsidiaries (without succeeding). It is
worth noting that this inclination does not seem
to be associated with a high foreign penetration
in the financial sector – Russia had a low
foreign presence at the time of the crisis.65
Anecdotal evidence suggests that DPSI
measures tend to proliferate in countries that
have defaulted on their international
obligations during the period immediately
preceding external default.66 These measures
tend to be cumulative as the authorities face
increasing problems in implementing a
domestic adjustment programme, continuing to
service their debt and ensuring external
sustainability. Argentina is a case in point: the
failure to implement the needed fiscal
consolidation led, initially, to the introduction
of a market-based approach to PSI (the “mega-
swap”) and to the exertion of moral suasion on
domestic creditors (the “patriotic bond”) and,
subsequently, to an increasingly coercive
approach which eventually included an internal
default,67 capital controls and stringent limits
on bank deposit withdrawals. Although in
Ecuador and Russia an internal default did not
precede the external default, there were
important pre-default DPSI measures, such as
64 We refer in this point mainly to subsidiaries of international
banks, which are subject to host country regulation,
supervision and, where relevant, deposit insurance, and are
therefore part of the domestic banking system. Given their
different legal status and the dependency of their operations
on those of the head office, branches are more akin to cross-
border lending.
65 This low presence reflects tight regulatory restrictions for
foreign banks operating in Russia.
66 As we can see in Table 4, in Turkey, the only country among the
four considered in this paper that did not default on its
external debt, the extent of DPSI was very limited.
67 In Argentina, the exchange of domestic government bonds for
collateralised debt (which occurred prior to the devaluation
and default) is widely seen as the date of the internal default.60
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Russia’s failed attempt to exchange domestic
debt and Ecuador’s deposit freeze. This
suggests that policy-makers in countries facing
severe debt servicing problems tend to exhaust
the options for involving domestic creditors in
crisis resolution prior to resorting to a default
on their external obligations, notwithstanding
the fact that this piecemeal approach often
provides very little breathing space. At least
two sets of considerations explain this
inclination to “gamble for redemption”. First,
because of the jurisdictional dimension of
DPSI, the sovereign can more easily impose
debt restructuring measures on domestic
creditors. Second, a suspension of foreign debt
service payments presents policy-makers with
the prospect of protracted negotiations with
foreign creditors, litigation risk, and prolonged
loss of access to international financial
markets. In the short run, the authorities may
consider such costs higher than those induced
by DPSI measures.
Conversely, after an external default, the
authorities tend to be more lenient with
domestic creditors than with foreign creditors.
For instance, in Ecuador the reduction in NPV
of the debt restructured with domestic creditors
was 9%, compared with 35% for the debt
restructured with foreign creditors. In
Argentina pension funds have ultimately been
given somewhat special treatment in
recognition of the fact that they bore a
substantial share of the weight of pre-default
PSI.68 In addition, the authorities have
excluded guaranteed loans and Bodens from
the restructuring offer on the grounds that the
former were the result of a previous debt
restructuring while the latter were issued
mainly as a banking compensation for the
asymmetric pesification and indexation of
assets and liabilities. When domestic and
external creditors hold similar claims, it may
be difficult to treat them in non-comparable
ways, not least as this could prevent a high
level of participation in the restructuring.
There may be a difference in this regard in
relation to domestic creditors depending on
whether the bonds are held by the financial or
68 The October 2004 deal between the Argentinean government
and the pension funds (AFJPs) contemplated a lower haircut
for certain bonds with a face value of USD 2,600 million (out
of a total debt in default with pension funds of approximately
USD 17,000 million).
the non-financial sector. Non-financial
domestic debt-holders tend to be treated as
external creditors, whereas the authorities tend
to be more cautious with regard to financial
debt-holders when they hold a significant
portion of public debt. This can be explained by
the fact that, in the later stages of a crisis, the
domestic banking system solvency is already
seriously undermined and the government
faces the prospect of restructuring the banking
system and probably injecting public funds,
making any attempt to impose an additional
haircut on bank holdings of public debt
pointless. In addition, given the losses imposed
on residents prior to the default and the social
impact of the crisis, there may at this stage be
little room to force further post-default DPSI
measures.
4 SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
DPSI and PSI are typically not perfect
substitutes, mainly because DPSI can have
deeper and longer-lasting effects on the
economy than PSI. Before making DPSI an
explicit pillar of a crisis resolution framework
very careful consideration needs to be given to
its direct contractionary impact on and
confidence implications for the domestic
economy, which tend to aggravate the cost of
the crisis. In any case, it is difficult to
distinguish between domestic PSI and
domestic adjustment as both sets of measures
tend to overlap and to feed each other.
A critical policy issue is the destabilising effect
that DPSI can have on domestic financial
institutions. In sovereign debt crises, policy-
makers are normally faced with a trade-off
between preserving the stability of the banking
system and avoiding external sovereign
default.61
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The interactions between the government and
the banking sector in a crisis situation often
entail some elements of both a bail-in and a
bail-out. This two-directional link complicates
the measurement and assessment of DPSI and
its comparison with PSI.
The timing of DPSI v. PSI depends to some
extent on the situation in the banking sector at
the start of the crisis: if the banking sector
starts off weak, there is hardly any scope for
DPSI as the government has to inject funds into
the banking sector from the outset; if the
banking sector is relatively sound at first, the
government often resorts to DPSI before
considering external PSI measures.
DPSI measures (notably public debt placement
via regulatory changes or moral suasion) that
are taken mainly to avoid a default on
international sovereign obligations are usually
inefficient (as they do not really restore
sustainable debt dynamics) and even counter-
productive (as they lead to the collapse of
banking and payment systems) and therefore
aggravate the cost of the crisis. To a large
extent, losses generated by DPSI are ultimately
borne by depositors and taxpayers.62
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Table 4 The experiences of Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Turkey
Country Characteristics of the crisis
Before height of the crisis
Measures taken by the 
authorities
Impact on the domestic 
private sector Quantitative indicators
Argentina  Sovereign debt and currency 
crisis: exchange rate rigidity 
and misalignment; lack of 
ﬁ  scal discipline in federal 
and provincial governments. 
Social turmoil; low investor 
conﬁ  dence (Asian and Russian 
crises). Banking solvency not 
an issue until relatively late in 
the crisis.
Public sector weaknesses: 
the combination of a 
prolonged economic slump 
and difﬁ  culties in mounting a 
political response to the ﬁ  scal 
problem introduced adverse 
public debt dynamics. Public 
debt: 38% of GDP in 1998, 
57% of GDP in 2001, 135% of 
GDP in 2002. Growing share of 
domestic debt: 28% of total in 
1998, 41% of total in 2001.
Fragility in balance sheets: 
important credit risk 
(accumulation of dollar debt in 
non-tradable sectors); 60% of 
deposits denominated in USD 
in 2001. 
Capital ﬂ  ight: USD 10.5 billion 
in 2001. USD 12.8 billion in 
2002.
Tax on ﬁ  nancial transactions 
(0.25 to 0.6%).
“Mega-swap” of government 
bonds.
Launch of 3-year USD 1 billion 
“patriotic bond” to be absorbed 
by large enterprises and banks.
Exchange of domestic 
government bonds for loans 
at 4%, collateralised by tax 
revenues with a grace period. 
Ultimately this debt was 
“pesiﬁ  ed”. 
Introduction of capital controls 
and limits on withdrawals from 
bank deposits: “corralito” and 
“corralón”.
Extensive moral suasion 
exerted on pension funds 
(AFJPs) and banks to absorb 
public debt. Instances of quasi-
forced accumulation of public 
debt.
The mega-swap was an attempt 
to carry out a market based 
debt restructuring. It failed to 
restore debt sustainability, and 
the new bonds were included in 
the later debt exchange.
The exchange of domestic 
bonds for loans is widely 
considered to mark the moment 
of the default on domestic debt.
The “corralito” included a 
weekly limit of USD 250 on 
withdrawals. The “corralón” 
was a freeze on term deposits.
Riots, social unrest, fall of the 
government.
Decline in credit to private 
sector from 20% of GDP to 
10% of GDP.
Increase in the exposure of 
domestic private banks/AFJPs 




Government bonds with a 
face value of USD 29.5 billion 
“voluntarily” exchanged in 
mega-swap, of which USD 
22 billion (75%) is domestic 
debt. 
About USD 55 billion 
of domestic public debt 
“voluntarily” exchanged 
mainly by banks and pension 
funds. Ultimately, the 
exchange implied a reduction 
of 60% in the NPV of the 
renegotiated debt.
Ecuador Sovereign debt, currency 
and banking crises: political 
uncertainties; social turmoil; 
low investor conﬁ  dence; 
natural disasters. 
Financial sector vulnerabilities: 
shortcomings in the reform 
of the ﬁ  nancial system (moral 
hazard, surveillance weakness, 
lack of crisis resolution 
instruments etc.)
Public sector vulnerabilities: 
unstable dynamics in public 
debt, 73% of GDP in 1998 to 
over 130% of GDP in 1999. 
Debt service burden at 8.3% 
of GDP in 1998 and 18.1% of 
GDP in 2001. 88% of public 
debt external, 12% domestic.
Informal dollarisation: 35% 
of quasi money in 1998. 
Unhedged foreign exchange 
exposures and currency 
mismatches. (16% of deposits 
in 1998) Formal dollarisation 
in Jan. 2000.
Extensive liquidity support to 
various banks.
Introduction of a blanket 
guarantee on deposits.
1% tax on ﬁ  nancial 
transactions.
Attempt at selective default on 
collateralised Brady bonds.
Bank holiday and freeze on 
bank deposits. Depositors 
received negotiable claims 
(CRDs) on their banks.
Eventually, and as a result of 
political pressures, the freeze 
was lifted prematurely, further 
aggravating the banking crisis.
Loss of monetary control. 
Bouts of hyperinﬂ  ation.
Large depositor losses 
resulting from delays in the 
materialisation of the deposits 
guarantee, the devaluation 
of the Ecuadorian sucre, and 
inﬂ  ation.
The tax introduced further 
incentives to transact outside 
the banking system.
Failure of selective default: 
bond holders voted to 
accelerate their bonds.
CRDs traded at a discount 
according to perception of each 
bank’s solvency.
Collapse of the payment 
system. 
Estimated ﬁ  scal cost of the 
banking crisis: USD 2.7 
billion, 24% of GDP.
The estimated haircut for 
sucre depositors was 80%, and 
12% for US dollar depositors.
17% fall in deposits following 
the introduction of the tax.
58% (equivalent to USD 3.7 
billion) of deposits affected by 
the freeze (July 1999).
Acceleration in the pace of 
currency substitution: the 
share of USD in quasi money 
jumped to 60% in 1999. 63
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Table 4 The experiences of Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Turkey
Country
After height of the crisis
Measures taken by the authorities
Impact on the domestic 
private sector Quantitative indicators
Argentina  Payments suspended on all bilateral 
and private external debt. End of 
convertibility and devaluation. 
Asymmetric pesiﬁ  cation and indexation 
of bank balance sheets. Issuance of 
“compensatory bonds” for banks.
Regulatory forbearance: suspension 
of minimum capital requirement and 
obligation to present banks’ ﬁ  nancial 
statements. Court ordered injunctions 
(“amparos judiciales”) forcing banks 
to pay out USD deposits at previous 
exchange rate. 
Extensive liquidity support to domestic 
banking system provided by the 
central bank (BCRA). Instances of 
discrimination against foreign entities. 
Freeze on regulated utility prices.
Debt restructuring offer (did not include 
debt issued after Dec. 2001).
Debt swap launched on 14 Jan. 2005 (to 
25 Feb. 2005).
Asymmetric pesiﬁ  cation shifted burden 
of devaluation onto banks and taxpayers, 
resulting in collapse of ﬁ  nancial system.
Less central bank liquidity for foreign-
owned banks in attempt to involve head 
ofﬁ  ces in recapitalisation of Argentinean 
subsidiaries. Some banks pulled 
out (Scotiabank, Intesa BCI, Credit 
Agricole). 
Freeze on utility prices considered a 
breach of rule of law. Discrimination 
against foreign companies.
Argentine residents hold about 38% of 
debt referred to in offer.
Over 50% of domestic defaulted debt 
held by pension funds. This will have 
impact on future pensions. Banks 
partially shielded by exclusion of Bodens 
and guaranteed loans.
Banks’ existing dollar denominated 
assets and liabilities converted at ARS 1 
= USD 1 for loans to private sector, and 
ARS 1.4 = USD 1 for loans to public 
sector and USD deposits. 
At market prices banks’ net worth fell to 
negative levels (S&P has estimated it at 
USD 10 billion).
Approx. USD 10.6 billion in 
compensation bonds.
Impact of utility price freeze has yet to 
be determined.
Bond restructuring offer: reduction of 
75% in face value of approx. USD 100 
billion of defaulted debt including past-
due interests. 
Agreement reached with pension funds 
in Oct. 2004 (approx. 17% of defaulted 
debt). Special treatment granted to some 
of restructured debt.
Ecuador Renegotiation of domestic public debt.
Introduction of a corporate debt 
restructuring scheme, compulsory for 
small debtors and voluntary for large 
borrowers.
Suspension of payments on external, 
commercial and Paris Club debt.
Default on internationally traded bonds 
(Brady and Eurobonds) in September 
1999.
Unilateral offer to restructure 
internationally traded bonds. 12 and 30-
year maturity for new bonds. 85% take up 
for the offer to be effective.
Private banks were the largest holders 
of domestic public debt. Limited 
impact on pension funds and pensioners 
(unreformed pension system).
The terms of the restructuring were 
milder for residents, in light of the 
weaknesses exhibited by the banking 
sector.
The framework for corporate debt 
restructuring was aimed at mitigating 
the impact of the crisis on small debtors, 
and at restoring the sustainability of large 
borrowers’ debt.
Total amount of debt restructured: 
56.4% of GDP.
Restructured domestic debt: USD 346 
million.
Reduction of NPV of domestic debt: 9%.
About 800 000 small domestic bonds 
rescheduled (92% of loans in the 
system).
USD 804 million rescheduled by Paris 
Club (no reduction in NPV).
International restructured bonds: USD 
6.65 billion (46% of external debt). 98% 
of bondholders accepted the offer. NPV 
reduction: 35%.64
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Table 4 The experiences of Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Turkey
Country Characteristics of the crisis
Before height of the crisis
Measures taken by the 
authorities
Impact on the domestic 
private sector Quantitative indicators
Russia  Sovereign debt, currency and 
banking crises due to political 
and external shocks, in context 
of low investor conﬁ  dence after 
Asian crises.
Public sector vulnerabilities: 
high reliance on short term 
ﬁ  nancing, weak tax recovery, 
weak ﬁ  nancial discipline; 
sovereign debt (end 1997): 
foreign exchange debt 31.4% 
of GDP, domestic debt 18% 
of GDP.
Weak market discipline: high 
level of arrears and high 
share of monetary surrogates 
in domestic transactions; 
persistent capital ﬂ  ight (USD 
22.3 billion in 1997).
Vulnerable domestic banking 
system (Dec. 1997). High 
dollarisation: foreign exchange 
deposits 26% of total, foreign 
exchange credit 34% of total. 
High exposure to government 
credit risk (31.5% of assets). 
High off-balance-sheet foreign 
exchange exposure.
Voluntary domestic debt 
exchange of Russian Treasury 
bills (GKOs) for 7 to 20-year 
Eurobonds (July 1998).
Delayed strengthening of 
market discipline.
USD 22.6 billion IMF 
programme (July 98), but 
interrupted soon after.
After two major banks stopped 
payments, massive liquidity 
support to numerous small 
banks (estimated USD 100 
million).
Large intervention by Russian 
central bank (CBR) to support 
exchange rate (equivalent to ¼ 
of base money).
High arrears accumulated by 
government (RUB 10 billion, 
end 1997).
Limits imposed on foreign 
exchange purchases by 
commercial banks.
Acceleration of demonetisation 
and dissolution of payment 
discipline.
Low acceptance of debt 
exchange.
Acceleration of capital ﬂ  ight.
Hurt by accumulated arrears on 
public sector expenditures.
USD 4.4 billion of debt 
exchanged out of USD 40 
billion eligible, at very high 
spreads.
Total deposits fall 14 
percentage points to 38.7% 
of broad money at end 1998 
(50% in real terms.
Non-cash industrial 
transactions estimated at 55% 
of total in Aug. 1998.
Net open foreign exchange 
position of commercial banks: 
USD 10 billion (with off-
balance-sheet forward foreign 
exchange claims of USD 93 
billion).
Turkey Banking and currency crises 
resulting from high balance 
sheet vulnerabilities in banking 
sector and slow banking sector 
reforms in context of the 
disinﬂ  ation process and current 
account widening.
Vulnerable domestic banking 
sector: high net foreign 
exchange open position of 
commercial banks (USD 2.6 
billion, end 2000); poorly 
regulated; low foreign presence 
(7% of total assets, 1% of total 
deposits, end 2000).
Turkish central bank (CBT) 
temporarily suspended its net 
domestic assets (NDA) target. 
Banking sector restructuring 
was slow prior to ﬁ  rst banking 
crisis (Nov. 2000), as 16 banks 
had been taken over since Dec. 
1999 and recapitalised by the 
Savings Deposits Insurance 
Fund (SDIF) (USD 6.1 billion) 
but measures to streamline 
these entities were hardly 
implemented.
Full deposit and credit 
guarantee extended by end 
2000.
New prudential standard 
introduced in early 2000.
Liquidity injection and bail 
out measures failed to stem 
depositor fears, resident 
capital ﬂ  ight and currency 
substitution.
Because of tight connection 
between banks and political 
sphere, restructuring was 
disappointing.
Currency substitution: foreign 
exchange denominated 
deposits rose 12% points to 
55.6% of total by end 2001.
Capital ﬂ  ight accelerated 
(USD 2 billion, end 2000).65
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Table 4 The experiences of Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Turkey
Country
After height of the crisis
Measures taken by the authorities
Impact on the domestic 
private sector Quantitative indicators
Russia  Floatation of rouble.
Default on rouble sovereign debt 
maturing before 1999 (excluding claims 
held by households). Tight capital and 
exchange controls (98Q3-99Q4). Three 
month moratorium on private foreign 
debt (Aug. 1998).
Deposits. Transfer of some individuals‘ 
deposits to Sberbank; guarantee of 
deposits held in Sberbank; freeze 
(98Q4-99Q1).
CBR sought (and failed) to obtain from 
foreign banks the recapitalisation of their 
subsidiaries.
Domestic banks bore most part of the 
shock as they held 72% of defaulted debt, 
credit portfolio quality collapsed against 
weak creditor rights, large unhedged 
foreign exchange liabilities, foreign 
exchange loans to domestic corporates. 
Most top-50 banks became insolvent.
Depositors bear real losses from deposit 
freeze, exchange controls and inﬂ  ation.
Regulatory forbearance: soundness 
indicators were “frozen” for 168 
“eligible” banks; very few licenses were 
revoked.
Defaulted debt (excluding Paris Club): 
USD 48.6 billion, 10.8% of GDP. 
Haircut: 37.5% reduction in principal of 
PRINS and 33% of IANS.
Net capital ﬂ  ight: USD 26.3 billion in 
1998. Slightly abated in 1999 (decrease 
of USD 0.9 billion).
Banking sector losses: ROA1 = -3.5% 
(end 1998), -0.3% (end 1999). ROE2 = 
-28.6% (end 1998), -4.0% (end 1999).
Continued currency substitution (end 
1998): foreign exchange deposits 41.9% 
of total, foreign exchange credits 55% 
of total.
Bad loans jumped to 30% of total (end 
1998) against 12% in 1997.
Turkey CBT did not suspend its NDA target 
despite sharp liquidity shortage of banks. 
Treasury extended (i) foreign exchange 
bonds to help close net foreign exchange 
open position and (ii) ﬂ  oating rate notes 
to cover “duty losses”.
Banks beneﬁ  ted from generous tax 
deductions as an incentive for voluntary 
merger and consolidation.
As debt rose fast, authorities favoured 
active debt management (voluntary 
debt swaps in June 2001) and ﬁ  scal 
credibility measures to secure voluntary 
involvement of private sector.
To support strengthening of banks’ capital 
base, supervisory authority suspended 
dividend distributions.
Banking sector was partly insulated from 
large structural ﬁ  scal adjustment needed 
to cope with current account deﬁ  cit and 
rising public debt.
Foreign exchange risk was actually 
transferred to government.
Commercial banks and private residents 
reduced their holdings of central 
government debt during 2001 (as 
percentage of total debt).
However, deep restructuring in domestic 
banking sector took place.
Exposure to public risk rose signiﬁ  cantly 
as a percentage of assets.
Bank consolidation: recapitalisation 
public bonds: 35% of GNP in 2001; net 
open foreign exchange position of banks 
(end 2001) closed: USD 0.1 billion. 
Global cost of bank restructuring: 28% 
of GNP.
Public debt: central government foreign 
exchange indexed debt (end 2001): 
50.7% of total debt, up 13 percentage 
points compared to end 2000; net 
public debt (end 2001): external up 
19.7 percentage points to 38% of GNP, 
domestic up 15.1 percentage points to 
54.2% of GNP. 
Government debt holding (as percentage 
of total debt): central bank up 24 
percentage points to 28.2%, private 
residents down 13 percentage points 
to 3.3%, commercial banks down 14 
percentage points to 53%.
1) Return on assets.
2) Return on equity.66
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